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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since Congress began to regulate consumer credit in earnest by 
passing the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)1 in 1968, creditors have had to 
disclose the essential elements of their credit transactions.2  TILA was a 
welcome development given the nature of the competition in the 
marketplace, for consumers were able thereafter to compare the credit 
opportunities available to them.3  Lenders could no longer devise their 
own disclosure strategies for making their loan programs more 
attractive, because they had to follow a prescribed statutory formula that 
put everybody on an even playing field.  It became easier for consumers 
to understand how much they were paying for credit, because a loan’s 
finance charge no longer meant different things to different people.4  The 
new disclosure rules introduced a standard method for recognizing the 
true cost of credit, and they comprised the same elements regardless of 
the lender’s standing in the business community.5
 1. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2000)). 
 2. For example, creditors have to disclose the amount financed and the finance 
charge expressed as an annual percentage rate.  15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)(A), (a)(3), (a)(4) 
(2000). 
 3. A House report reflected some of the legislative concerns as follows: 
    Today the consumer is faced with a number of credit disclosure practices, 
most of which are not directly comparable to one another.  With respect to rate, 
some creditors employ an “add on” rate, which is based on the original balance 
of the obligation as opposed to the declining balance.  This has the effect of 
understating the simple annual rate by approximately 50 percent. 
    . . . . 
    The committee believes that by requiring all creditors to disclose credit 
information in a uniform manner, and by requiring all additional mandatory 
changes imposed by the creditor as an incident to credit be included in the 
computation of the applicable percentage rate, the American consumer will be 
given the information he needs to compare the cost of credit and to make the 
best informed decision on the use of credit. 
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1970–71. 
 4. One authority identified the problem this way: 
Creditors did not use a uniform way of calculating interest, or a single system 
for defining what additional charges would be included in the interest rate.  
Thus, a consumer had no way of knowing, for example, that a $6000 car 
financed through the dealer at 6% might well have been more expensive than 
financing it at 10% through a credit union. 
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING § 1.1.1 (5th ed. 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
 5. TILA provides an all-inclusive definition of “finance charge.”  It defines the 
“finance charge” as the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to 
whom the credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an 
incident to the extension of credit.  15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000).  TILA contains several 
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Regulation Z, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to 
TILA,6 identifies the finance charge as the cost of consumer credit and 
further explains that it includes any charge that the lender imposes as “an 
incident to or a condition of the extension of credit.”7  It is not surprising 
that there are sometimes disagreements over the “incident” or “condition” 
language, for the mere fact that a consumer must pay a charge in a 
transaction does not always mean that such a charge is in fact incident to 
or a condition of the extension of credit.8  This Article will first tackle 
the problems of identifying the essential elements of a finance charge by 
discussing some recent cases.  It will be seen that a charge that a consumer 
pays in connection with a transaction does not necessarily make it a 
finance charge, and that courts must look further before categorizing a 
consumer’s payment.9
Another feature of Truth in Lending that has been the subject of debate 
is the consumer’s right of rescission.  Under normal circumstances, a 
consumer may rescind a transaction until midnight of the third business 
day following consummation, delivery of the notice of the right of 
rescission, or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever comes 
last.10  When the consumer rescinds within three business days, there is 
usually no problem because the consumer has an unconditional right to 
exceptions to the definition.  See id.; see also RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, 
TRUTH IN LENDING ¶ 3.02[1] (2000). 
 6. Congress authorized the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to prescribe 
regulations to carry out the purposes of TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a).  As a result, the 
Board issued Regulation Z.  See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2007). 
 7. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (2007). 
 8. TILA uses the language “incident to,” 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000), but 
Regulation Z goes further and uses the phrase “incident to or a condition of the extension 
of credit,” 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (2007).  In 1996, the Board revised Regulation Z to 
recognize a fee charged in connection with debt collection agreements as a finance 
charge because it is part of the cost of credit.  The Board regarded the fee as being 
charged in connection with the loan, and therefore incident to the extension of credit.  
See Regulation Z, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,237, 49,239 (Sept. 19, 1996). 
 9. In Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 240 (2004), the 
Supreme Court recognized that there was some connection between an over-limit fee and 
an extension of credit.  Nevertheless, the Court recognized also that TILA’s categorization of 
the over-limit fee as one assessed “in connection with an extension of credit” did not 
mean that it was imposed “incident to the extension of credit.”  Id. at 241 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, the Court upheld the Board’s exclusion of the 
over-limit fee from the finance charge.  Id. at 245. 
 10. 15 U.S.C. §1635(f) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2007). 




do so.11  If the lender has failed to discharge its disclosure obligations, 
the consumer’s right of rescission can last as long as three years.  
Nevertheless, once the three-day period expires, the lender is normally 
not receptive to the consumer’s rescission and the consumer must then 
try to show how the lender has failed to meet the disclosure requirements.12
Many lenders have tried to avoid the challenge of the rescission 
procedure by coaxing the consumer into signing a form indicating that the 
consumer prematurely elects not to cancel the transaction.13  A lender 
normally seeks this assurance before the three-day rescission expires in 
order to disburse the funds promptly without worrying about the consumer’s 
change of heart.  The lender’s zeal to consummate a transaction often leads 
to disagreement about whether the lender gave the necessary clear and 
conspicuous disclosures when it mixed the premature election language 
with the notice of the consumer’s right to rescind.14  This Article will show 
both that the courts have consistently protected the consumer’s right to 
rescind and that major difficulties ensue when lenders try to avoid the 
nuances of the rescission procedure. 
Apart from the complications of rescission, a lender must confront the 
timing and form of the Truth in Lending disclosures.15  A lender’s disclosures 
mean much more to a consumer when the consumer has access to them 
for full review before consummation of the transaction.  The problem in 
this context is whether the lender satisfies the regulatory requirement of 
giving its consumers a copy of the disclosures that they can keep prior to 
consummation.  If all the copies of the disclosures are bound together, 
the consumer may argue that he does not have a copy he can keep, and 
then it is up to him to convince a court that he was unable to walk away 
 11. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.3.1; ROHNER & MILLER, 
supra note 5, ¶ 8.01. 
 12. See Jones v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 397 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2005); Gaona v. 
Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118 
(9th Cir. 1989); England v. MG Investments, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 718 (S.D. W. Va. 
2000); Stanley v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Stanley), 315 B.R. 602 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
2004); Webster v. Centex Home Equity Corp. (In re Webster), 300 B.R. 787 (Bankr. 
W.D. Okla. 2003); Williams v. BankOne (In re Williams), 291 B.R. 636 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2003); Johnson v. Thomas, 794 N.E.2d 919 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 13. See Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994); Rodrigues v. 
Members Mortgage Co., 323 F. Supp. 2d 202 (D. Mass. 2004);  Adams v. Nationscredit 
Fin. Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Wiggins v. Avco Fin. Servs., 62 
F. Supp. 2d 90 (D.D.C. 1999); Apaydin v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank (In re Apaydin), 201 
B.R. 716 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 14. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1144; Adams, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 830; Wiggins, 62 F. 
Supp. 2d at 93. 
 15. In closed-end transactions, the creditor must make the disclosures “clearly and 
conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may keep.”  12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(1) 
(2007).  With respect to timing, the creditor must make the disclosures “before consummation 
of the transaction.”  Id. § 226.17(b). 
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with a copy before committing himself to the transaction.16  The argument 
usually is that the lender did not provide the disclosures in a form that 
the consumer could keep.  Allied to this issue of the timing and form of 
the disclosures is the matter of the timing of consummation.17  Any discussion 
of this issue must necessarily deal with the conditions that are attached 
to the financing of the transaction between the parties.  An examination 
of the cases will show that the courts generally look to see whether the 
consumer was contractually obligated on the transaction or whether a 
condition prevented that from happening.18
Consumers may also be surprised about what awaits them once an 
agreement is in effect.  That surprise may come as the result of a change-
in-terms provision that the lender uses to its own advantage.19  A consumer 
who is attracted by the lender’s solicitations may later find that a promised 
term is short-lived because of another provision in the agreement that 
allows for a change in terms at the lender’s behest.  Occasionally that change 
is the insertion of an arbitration clause, and a court has to decide whether 
an arbitrator or a court should deal with a consumer’s challenge.20
Finally there is the question of damages when a lender is found liable 
for a Truth in Lending violation.  This Article will discuss the amounts 
 16. The problem normally arises when the disclosures are placed on the same 
document with the credit contract, and the document comprises multiple copies bound 
together.  If the creditor gives the consumer these multiple copies clipped together, it is 
open to question whether the creditor has given the disclosures to the consumer in a form 
that the consumer may keep.  The Official Staff Commentary recognizes that “[t]he 
consumer must be free to take possession of and review the document in its entirety 
before signing.”  12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)(3) (2007).  The staff of the Board 
issues interpretations of Regulation Z through the Official Staff Commentary and a 
creditor’s reliance on the Commentary protects the creditor from civil liability under TILA.  
See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1 (2007). 
 17. Regulation Z defines “consummation” as “the time that a consumer becomes 
contractually obligated on a credit transaction.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13) (2007). 
 18. See Bragg v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., 374 F.3d 1060, 1067 (11th Cir. 2004); 
Grimes v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 340 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2003); Gaona v. 
Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2003); Graves v. Tru-Link Fence 
Co., 905 F. Supp. 515, 520 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 19. See Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 342 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2003); 
Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002); Stone v. Golden 
Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Perry v. FleetBoston 
Fin. Corp., No. 04-507, 2004 WL 1508518 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004). 
 20. See Stone, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 193; Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 
819, 821 (S.D. Miss. 2001); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 275 (Ct. App. 
1998). 




that are available in lease and non-lease transactions,21 and will identify 
the kinds of violations that give rise thereto.22
II.  THE FINANCE CHARGE 
A.  Characterizing the Charge 
The search for truth in lending spans a wide area.  A creditor must 
disclose enough information so that consumers will be well informed 
about the essential ingredients of the loan that they are contemplating.23  
Perhaps the greatest challenge for a creditor is in disclosing the finance 
charge for the loan and expressing it as an annual percentage rate 
(APR).24  Sometimes a creditor will have problems because it is unsure 
whether a particular item should be included in the finance charge.  
TILA provides some guidance about the meaning of “finance charge” by 
defining it as an amount that a creditor imposes “as an incident to the 
extension of credit” to the consumer.25  Regulation Z uses slightly different 
 21. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004) (applying the 
$100/$1,000 limits on TILA’s statutory damages to both leases and non-real-estate loans 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (2000)). 
 22. The issue that crops up in this connection is whether a consumer can recover 
statutory damages for a creditor’s failure to make timely disclosures.  Compare Lozada 
v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 878, 889 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding 
that §1640(a) allows statutory damages to be awarded for violations of § 1638(b)(1)), 
and Walters v. First State Bank, 134 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding that 
consumer could recover statutory damages and any actual damages because creditor gave him 
a copy of disclosures only after the consumer signed the contract), with Baker v. Sunny 
Chevrolet, Inc., 349 F.3d 862, 871 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that statutory damages are 
not available for dealer’s failure to make timely disclosures under § 1638(b)(1)), and 
Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 319 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that 
creditor’s liability arose when consummation occurred under unfunded financing agreement), 
rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004), and Graham v. RRR, LLC, 202 F. Supp. 2d 
483, 488 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that consumer must prove actual damages in order to 
recover for dealer’s untimely disclosures under § 1638(b), since statutory damages are 
not available). 
 23. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a (2007) (disclosures in credit and charge card applications 
and solicitations); id. § 226.6 (initial disclosure statement in open-end credit); id. § 226.18 
(content of disclosures in closed-end credit).  “Open-end credit” contemplates repeated 
transactions between the consumer and the creditor, id. § 226.2(a)(20), while “closed-
end credit” means consumer credit other than open-end credit, id. § 226.2(a)(10). 
 24. See id. § 226.7(f), (g) (periodic statements in open-end transactions), id. § 226.18(d), (e) 
(disclosures in closed-end credit).  The terms “finance charge” and “annual percentage rate” 
must, with certain exceptions, be disclosed more conspicuously than any other disclosure.  Id. 
§ 226.5(a)(2); id. § 226.17(a)(2). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000).  The congressional report explained the disclosure 
of the finance charge in these terms: “The basic disclosure concept contained in the 
proposed legislation is to require lenders and merchants to provide consumers with a 
statement of the ‘finance charge’ imposed by the creditor in connection with the 
particular consumer credit transaction.”  H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), reprinted 
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1971.  Then in its section-by-section analysis, the report 
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language by identifying the finance charge as “the cost of consumer 
credit” and then by stating that it includes any charge imposed “as an 
incident to or a condition of the extension of credit.”26  The similarity in 
language suggests that the Board tried its level best to capture Congress’s 
intent by ensuring that a creditor must inform the consumer of the true 
cost of credit. 
From time to time, disagreements arise over the proper designation of 
a charge, and it is then that a court must look to see whether the creditor 
has assessed the charge on the consumer “as an incident to or a condition 
of the extension of credit.”27  Not all charges are a part of the finance charge.28  
Regulation Z gives some examples of costs that are included in the 
finance charge, but it also specifically excludes others from the definition.  
One charge that the regulation excludes from the finance charge is that 
imposed on a consumer for exceeding a credit limit.29  When the consumer 
in Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig complained about the creditor’s 
failure to include such an item in the finance charge, it was left to the 
Supreme Court to decide whether the Board had gone too far by 
excluding such an over-limit fee.30
The Court had to decide first whether Congress had directly addressed 
the issue.  If it had not, then the regulation would be controlling unless it 
was “arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”31  The Court recognized some ambiguity in the term “finance 
charge” as it related to over-limit fees in this transaction.32  This was not 
surprising, given the requirement that the charge had to be “incident to 
explained the definition of “finance charge” as “all mandatory charges imposed by a 
creditor and payable by an obligor as an incident to the extension of credit.”  Id. at 23, 
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1980.  This “incident to” and “in connection with” 
language also came up again in the context of including voluntary debt cancellation fees 
in the finance charge.  The Board interpreted the definition of “finance charge” to include 
“any fee charged by the creditor in connection with the loan, if it is not charged in 
comparable cash transactions and is not subject to an express exemption.”  Regulation Z, 
61 Fed. Reg. 49,237, 49,239 (Sept. 19, 1996). 
 26. 12 C.F.R § 226.4(a) (2007). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. § 226.4(c)–(e). 
 29. See id. § 226.4(c)(3). 
 30. 541 U.S. 232 (2004). 
 31. Id. at 242 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 32. The Court explained: “While we acknowledge that there may be some fees not 
explicitly addressed by § 1605(a)’s definition of ‘finance charge’ but which are unambiguously 
included in or excluded by that definition, over-limit fees are not such fees.”  Id. 




the extension of credit.”33  The Court was not sure whether the phrase 
“incident to” required a substantial connection between the charge 
and the credit, and therefore, there was some doubt whether the finance 
charge included over-limit fees.34  The Court also observed that it was 
reasonable to characterize such fees as a penalty because a creditor 
imposes them only when the consumer exceeds his credit limit.35  On the 
other hand, the creditor would not have imposed its fee if the consumer 
had not exceeded her credit limit.  It was this feature that contributed to 
the ambiguity of the charge.  It was this aspect of the transaction that led 
the court of appeals below to characterize the fee as a finance charge,36 
because the consumer seemed to benefit from an extension of credit, 
even though the creditor was not enthusiastic about it.37
Although TILA provides that a consumer may incur two types of 
charges in an open-end credit plan, namely a finance charge and other 
charges imposed as part of the plan, it does not specify which charges 
comprise each category.38  This is a further example of the ambiguity 
that the Pfennig Court recognized in addressing the reasonableness of 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000).  In the case of an application or solicitation for a 
credit card account, TILA requires a creditor to disclose applicable percentage rates, 
annual fees, and other information.  Id. § 1637(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (c)(1)(B).  As part of the 
“other information” required, the creditor must disclose “[a]ny fee imposed in connection 
with an extension of credit in excess of the amount of credit authorized to be extended 
with respect to such account.”  Id. § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii).  The language “in connection 
with an extension of credit” is different from “incident to the extension of credit.”  This 
difference suggests that the over-limit charge does not fall within the finance charge and 
creates the ambiguity identified by the Court.  See Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 241. 
 34. The Court agreed that there is some connection.  See Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 241.  
But in making its point that the term “finance charge” is ambiguous standing alone, the 
Court explained: “[T]his Court has recognized that the phrase ‘incident to or in 
conjunction with’ implies some necessary connection between the antecedent and its 
object, although it ‘does not place beyond rational debate the nature or extent of the 
required connection.’”  Id. at 240–41 (quoting Holly Farms Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations 
Bd., 517 U.S. 392, 403 n.9 (1996)). 
 35. See id. at 243. 
 36. See Pfennig v. Household Credit Servs., Inc., 295 F.3d 522, 528–29 (6th Cir. 
2002), rev’d, 541 U.S. 232 (2004).  The consumer alleged that the card issuer “knowingly and 
routinely” allowed its customers to exceed the credit limits.  Id. at 529 n.2. 
 37. The Supreme Court would not accept the distinction that the court of appeals 
had made between unilateral acts of default and acts of default when a consumer exceeds 
his credit limit.  See Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 244.  It was the Court’s view that “a creditor’s 
‘authorization’ of a particular point-of-sale transaction [did] not represent a final 
determination that a particular transaction [was] within a consumer’s credit limit because 
the authorization system [was] not suited to identify instantaneously and accurately over-
limit transactions.”  Id. 
 38. Subsections 1637(a)(1)–(4) relate in one way or another to the finance charge, 
but paragraph 5 then requires disclosure of “other charges” which the creditor may impose 
under the open-end credit plan.  15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(1)–(5) (2000).  This suggests, therefore, 
that Congress contemplated other charges besides the finance charge.  But TILA’s 
examples of a finance charge do not include over-limit fees.  See id. § 1605(a). 
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the regulation.  However, this much is clear: Congress did not intend to 
include all charges within the finance charge.39  The challenge is, therefore, in 
deciphering where each charge belongs.  The drafters did not help much 
in clarifying the issue for the over-limit fee.  They identified the specific 
items that a creditor had to disclose in applications and solicitations for 
credit, but they alluded to other information that must be disclosed to 
complete the picture.  Included in that information was “[a]ny fee imposed 
in connection with an extension of credit in excess of the amount of credit 
authorized.”40  It was open to question whether Congress was sending a 
message that although this over-limit fee was not imposed “incident to 
the extension of credit,” it was nevertheless a fee that a consumer should 
know about before applying for a credit card.41  This could explain why 
Congress opted for the phrase “in connection with” rather than “incident to” 
when it dealt with mail applications and solicitations under § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii).  
It wanted to give a complete picture of the credit transaction without 
necessarily fitting every conceivable expense into the category of a 
“finance charge.”42  TILA’s definition of that term makes no mention 
of over-limit fees, but by the same token it does not specifically exclude 
them as it does with respect to other items charged to the consumer.43  
The Court in Pfennig seized on the ambiguity in TILA’s treatment (or 
lack thereof) of the over-limit fees as an invitation to determine the 
reasonableness of the regulation in dealing with this matter.44
 39. The statute recognizes disclosures that are related to the finance charge, 15 
U.S.C. § 1637(a)(1)–(4), and also requires “[i]dentification of other charges which may 
be imposed as part of the plan,” id. § 1637(a)(5). 
 40. Id. § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii). 
 41. This is one place where the statute points out the difference between “in 
connection with” and “incident to” an extension of credit.  Compare id. § 1605(a), with 
id. § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii).  The “in connection with” language appears in § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii), 
dealing with disclosure in direct mail applications and solicitations for credit card 
accounts, but the reference to the over-limit fee relates to “other information” that the 
creditor must disclose besides matters concerning the finance charge. 
 42. For example, the finance charge does not include charges that are payable in a 
comparable cash transaction.  See id. § 1605(a). 
 43. See id. § 1605(d)–(e). 
 44. The Court stated: “Because § 1605 is ambiguous, the Board’s regulation 
implementing § 1605 ‘is binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or 
capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”  Household Credit Servs., 
Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232 (2004) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 227 (2001)). 




Regulation Z excludes from the finance charge any charge “for exceeding 
a credit limit.”45  There is no doubt about what the Board had in mind 
here.  The only question is whether this exclusion was reasonable in light of 
TILA’s overall objective.46  It is relevant that the regulation excludes 
charges from the finance charge not only when consumers exceed their 
credit limits, but also when they make unanticipated late payments, become 
delinquent, or default on an obligation.47  These are all events that follow 
an extension of credit and a diligent consumer may avoid such charges 
by complying with the terms of his loan.48  Therefore, this kind of charge 
looks more like a penalty than anything else, because it arises only when 
a consumer breaches the terms of his credit agreement, and it is not part 
and parcel of the original credit transaction.49
Although the Court in Pfennig recognized as reasonable the Board’s 
decision to exclude the over-limit charge from the finance charge, such 
an exclusion seems to depend on events that are largely within the 
consumer’s control.  If the creditor in Pfennig did allow the consumer to 
exceed her original credit limit, some people would understandably treat 
this as an extension of credit, with any resulting fees being part of the 
finance charge.50  This is not to say that it would be unreasonable for the 
 45. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2) (2007). 
 46. The Supreme Court has held that an agency’s regulation must be “given 
controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 47. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2) (2007). 
 48. Some commentators note that such charges are imposed “not as a charge for 
the credit, but to compensate for the costs related to the occurrence of specified 
conditions.” ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 5, ¶ 3.02[2][d]; see also 1 JAMES H. 
PANNABECKER, TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL ¶ 2.01[3] (rev. ed. 2007). 
 49. In this connection, the Board made the following observation when it was 
considering a revision to Regulation Z to implement amendments that Congress had 
made to simplify TILA: 
[T]he regulation reflects an emphasis on disclosures that are relevant to credit 
decisions, as opposed to disclosures related to events occurring after the initial 
credit choice.  In the Board’s view, the primary goals of the Truth in Lending 
Act are not particularly enhanced by regulatory provisions relating to changes 
in terms on outstanding obligations and on the effects of the failure to comply 
with the terms of the obligation. 
Credit; Truth in Lending; Revision of Regulation Z, 45 Fed. Reg. 80,648, 80,649 (Dec. 
5, 1980). 
 50. The Supreme Court would not accept the Sixth Circuit’s distinction between 
“‘unilateral’ acts of default and acts of default where a consumer exceeds his credit 
limit . . . .”  Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 244 (2004).  The 
Court did not see any negotiation between the creditor and the consumer for more credit.  
See id.  However, more attention should be paid to whether an over-limit charge is akin 
to an unanticipated event, as distinguished from a routine occurrence that is intended to 
produce a greater yield for a lender.  The exclusion for “exceeding a credit limit” appears 
in the context of “[c]harges for actual unanticipated late payment . . . or for delinquency, 
default, or a similar occurrence.”  12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2) (2007).  This language leaves 
the impression that the over-limit event should not result from an agreement between the 
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Board to exclude all penalties from such a charge.  But it is problematic 
for a creditor to set a credit limit and then routinely assess a fee whenever a 
consumer exceeds that unrealistic limit.  If a creditor’s authorization of a 
particular transaction does not represent a final decision that the transaction 
definitely falls within the consumer’s credit limit, then it is understandable 
that the Supreme Court would uphold the Board’s reasonable regulation.  
The Court was in effect saying that where the only outstanding arrangement 
is the original credit agreement, any subsequent advances that exceed 
that agreement will carry with it an attendant charge.  Until there is some 
other extension of credit, the consumer’s breach of the agreement leads 
to a charge that is akin to a late payment or a default charge.51
The difficulty in Pfennig is that § 1605(a) does not specifically cover 
over-limit fees and the Board filled the gap with its regulation covering 
such fees.  Even when TILA mentions over-limit fees, the reference occurs 
in the context of the creditor’s providing additional information to the 
consumer about fees that may be imposed in connection with the extension 
of credit, rather than incident thereto.52  This provided a sufficient opening 
for the Court to recognize that imposition of fees in connection with the 
extension of credit does not clearly make such fees incident to the extension 
of credit.53
The definition of “finance charge” has caused problems in other contexts.  
In Virachack  v. University Ford, a question arose about a rebate that 
was available to any consumer who paid cash or took a loan at a regular, 
nonpromotional rate.54  The rebate was not available for a loan that carried 
the low promotional rate of 0.9%.  The consumers argued that, because 
parties for additional credit, but rather from an unexpected, nonroutine advance.  This 
understanding of an over-limit charge flows from the context.  See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:16 (6th ed. 2000); see also ROHNER & 
MILLER, supra note 5, ¶ 3.02[2][d]. 
 51. The consumer undercut her case by alleging that the over-limit fee was imposed for 
every month when her balance exceeded her original credit limit.  See Pfennig, 541 U.S. 
at 240. 
 52. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(1)(B)(iii) (2000) (imposing over-the-limit fee 
“in connection with an extension of credit in excess of the amount of credit authorized”), 
with 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000) (imposing finance charge “as an incident to the 
extension of credit”). 
 53. See Pfennig, 541 U.S. at 241; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 
4, § 3.9.3.2. 
 54. 410 F.3d 579 (9th Cir. 2005). 




they did not qualify for the rebate, the creditor should have disclosed the 
difference in price as a finance charge.55
The court in Virachack looked to Regulation Z for a resolution of the 
question.  The regulation includes within the definition of “finance charge” 
those discounts given “for the purpose of inducing payment by a means 
other than the use of credit.”56  In this case, the dealer did not offer a rebate 
to induce customers to use means other than credit, since the rebate was 
available to consumers who financed their purchase at the nonpromotional 
higher rate.57  The creditor did not want to offer two incentives to the 
same consumer.  The consumer could either get the 0.9% loan, or he could 
take the higher interest loan and qualify for the rebate.  In a word, the 
manufacturer’s subsidy was available only to customers who were not 
getting the subsidized interest rate.58  There was an important element 
missing in the transaction if the consumers hoped to make their case for 
a hidden finance charge.  They could not show that the dealer had any 
intention to induce cash payments, for the sales price was the same for 
both cash and credit transactions.59  The rebate became relevant only after 
the dealer ascertained that the consumer was not getting the preferred 
interest rate. 
In a rebate-type case, the appropriate comparison is not between 
consumers using the specific type of credit and cash customers.  It is, 
instead, a comparison between credit customers as a group and cash 
customers.  Under the arrangement in Virachack, some credit customers 
could benefit from the low interest arrangement, while others could 
not.60  Therefore, one would have difficulty in finding the necessary 
inducement for a consumer to pay by some means other than credit.  A 
consumer would undoubtedly want the benefits of both bargains: the 
rebate and also the low interest rate.  But at least the rebate would still be 
available to a consumer who chose to finance at the higher interest rate.  
 55. See id. at 581. 
 56. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(9) (2007). 
 57. See Virachack, 410 F.3d at 582. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. The manufacturer did not want to offer two incentives to the same consumer.  
It offered a rebate only to those customers who were not getting a subsidized interest 
rate.  Id.  But the rebate is not a finance charge either when it is available to both cash 
and credit customers.  See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 4(a)-(1)(i)(B) (2007).  In Coelho v. 
Park Ridge Oldsmobile, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (N.D. Ill. 2003), the same rebate was 
available to cash customers and to credit customers who did not use the promotional 
interest rate.  The court held that the rebate was not a finance charge because “the rebate 
affect[ed] the customer’s net out-of-pocket costs, but not the negotiated sale price the 
customer owed [the dealer].”  Id. at 1009. 
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Therefore, it is not only the cash customer who benefits from a rebate, 
but credit customers as well.61
B.  Incident to or Condition of Extension of Credit 
The “incident to” phrase causes problems in another context.  If a consumer 
has to pay a fee at some point after the initial extension of credit, it may 
be in connection with the transaction rather than incident to the extension 
of credit.62  In that event, there is less attraction to the lender to categorize 
the fee as a finance charge.  The consumer may not see it as something 
other than a finance charge if he is unable to consummate the transaction 
in the way he desires without paying the fee.  In Pechinski v. Astoria Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, the consumers wanted to assign their loan to 
another lender as part of a refinancing arrangement in order to save mortgage 
recording tax.63  That privilege carried with it an assignment fee charged 
by the assignor for transferring the old mortgage to the new lender.64  
The consumers viewed this fee as part of the finance charge on the ground 
that it was imposed “incident to, or as a condition of, the extension of 
credit.”65
The lender imposed the assignment fee more than four years after the 
original loan and the consumers could not provide any evidence that the 
lender would not have made the loan in the absence of the consumers’ 
 61. The finance charge includes “[d]iscounts for the purpose of inducing payment 
by a means other than the use of credit.”  12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(9) (2007); see also Walker v. 
Wallace Auto Sales, Inc. 155 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that higher costs for 
buying with credit qualified as finance charges); Knapp v. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc., 
245 F. Supp. 2d 841, 846 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (holding that hidden acquisition fees for 
funding automobile purchases were finance charges because the consumer was required 
to pay the fees); 7 KENNETH M. LAPINE, BANKING LAW § 152.08 (2007) (“[A]n escrow 
fee normally imposed for both consumer credit and cash transactions is not a finance 
charge.”). 
 62. A clear example of a charge not being assessed incident to the extension of 
credit is when it is payable in a comparable cash transaction.  See Mayberry v. Ememessay, 
Inc. 201 F. Supp. 2d 687, 693–94 (W.D. Va. 2002) (finding that a fee to be paid to Department 
of Motor Vehicles was not a finance charge); Hodges v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, 
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 786, 793 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that a processing fee was not a 
finance charge where it was imposed on both cash and credit customers); 12 C.F.R. pt. 
226 supp. 1, cmt. 4(a)-1; NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 3.6.5.2; cf. Hook 
v. Baker, 352 F. Supp. 2d 839, 844 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (finding that a document preparation fee 
was a finance charge when assessed against credit customers only). 
 63. 345 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 




promise to pay the fee.  This element undermined the consumers’ position 
that this fee was imposed incident to the extension of credit.66  The 
creditor demanded an assignment fee following the consumers’ request 
for the lender to assign the mortgage to another lending institution.  Far 
from extending credit, the lender was facilitating the transfer of the 
outstanding documents, and not refinancing a transaction.67  In a sense, 
therefore, the lender was terminating its involvement with the consumers 
because it was extinguishing the debt.  Thereafter, the consumers would 
owe the debt to someone else. 
It is a different proposition, however, if a consumer is required to pay 
at the time of the loan for a subsequent assignment to a third party.  In 
that case, any assignment fee should be regarded as a finance charge.68  
It seems, therefore, that when a fee is imposed pursuant to some 
arrangement that follows the initial transaction, it is harder to show that 
the fee is imposed incident to the extension of credit.69
In determining whether a charge is imposed as a condition of granting 
credit, one must ask whether the lender required the consumer to pay the 
charge before it would extend credit.70  If the charge is merely for the 
accommodation of the consumer, it is easier to find that it is not part of 
the finance charge.  This situation usually arises, for example, with courier 
fees, when the lender is anxious to have payoffs executed as promptly as 
possible in order to avoid additional interest.  When the consumer has a 
choice in the matter, the charge is hardly one that is imposed as a 
 66. See id. at 82; see also Veale v. Citibank, F.S.B., 85 F.3d 577, 579 (11th Cir. 
1996). 
 67. The consumers had contended that TILA required the creditor to disclose any 
refinancing penalty.  See Pechinski, 345 F.3d at 81.  The regulation explains that a 
refinancing occurs “when an existing obligation . . . is satisfied and replaced by a new 
obligation undertaken by the same consumer.”  12 C.F.R. § 226.20 (2007).  Although the 
court referred only to the dictionary’s definition of “refinancing,” it stated that section 
226.18 was consistent with that definition.  Pechinski, 345 F.3d at 82. 
 68. See Brown v. Credithrift of Am. Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Brown), 106 B.R. 
852, 858–59 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding that fee imposed at closing for contemplated 
assignment constituted finance charge); Cheshire Mortgage Serv., Inc. v. Montes, 612 
A.2d 1130, 1132 (Conn. 1992) (holding that the fee charged for recording future 
assignments was a finance charge); 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 4(e)-(1)(ii); NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 3.7.8. 
 69. Adamson v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 861 F.2d 63, 65–66 (4th Cir. 1988), overruled 
on other grounds by Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Stutman v. Chem. Bank, No. 94-Civ.-5013 (MBM), 1996 WL 539845, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 24, 1996). 
 70. See First Acadiana Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 833 F.2d 548, 550 (5th 
Cir. 1987); Yazzie v. Ray Vicker’s Special Cars, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1232 
(D.N.M. 1998); Brodo v. Bankers Trust Co., 847 F. Supp. 353, 356–57 (E.D. Pa. 1994); 
James Lockhart, Annotation, What Constitutes “Finance Charge” Under § 106(a) of the 
Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (a)) or Applicable Regulations, 154 A.L.R. 
FED. 431 (1999). 
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condition of the extension of credit.71  Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that the “incident to” and the “condition of” elements are one and the same.  
In Veale v. Citibank, F.S.B., the courier fee was not incurred “incident to 
the extension of credit” because the consumers could have refused the 
Federal Express service and the creditor did not require it.72  This emphasis 
on the voluntariness of the consumer’s conduct tends to have little effect 
on the “incident to” prong, which for all intents and purposes is not 
dependent upon the consumer’s approval of the charge.  Therefore, even 
if a lender does not impose a fee as a condition in a particular case, it 
may still turn out to be “incident to” the grant of credit.  That was certainly 
the case in Pendleton v. American Title Brokers, where the consumer 
obtained a loan by pawning her car title, but then the creditor leased the 
car back to her at ten percent of the loan.73  Although the consumer did 
not have to enter into the lease-back arrangement in order to get the loan 
in the first place, the rental fee was nevertheless incident to the extension 
of the underlying credit.74  It may fairly be said, therefore, that voluntariness 
of the consumer’s action does not alone determine whether an item is a 
part of the finance charge.75
A fee that is imposed as part of a transaction is likewise not necessarily a 
part of the finance charge.  For example, in Matlock v. Atomic Pawn, 
Inc., a pawnbroker forced the consumer to pay a fee for a lost pawn 
ticket before the consumer could redeem her property or refinance the 
loan.76  The court concluded that the pawnbroker did not impose the fee 
 71. Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding 
courier fee not imposed as condition of loan when title company made its own decision 
as part of settling transaction); Scott v. Indymac Bank, FSB, No. 03-C-6489, 2005 WL 
730961, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2005) (holding courier fee was not a finance charge if 
not required or kept by lender). 
 72. 85 F.3d 577, 579 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 73. 754 F. Supp. 860, 861–62 (S.D. Ala. 1991). 
 74. Id. at 864.  The consumer decided to take the lease-back of the car, but she did 
not have to do so to obtain the loan.  Furthermore, the rental rate was determined by the 
amount of the loan, thus linking it to the extension of credit.  See 12 C.F.R., pt. 226, 
supp. 1, cmt. 17(c)(1)-18 (2007). 
 75. The Board discussed this concept of voluntariness when it amended Regulation 
Z in 1996 to indicate when a creditor can exclude debt cancellation fees from the finance 
charge.  It did not want to exclude all voluntary charges from the finance charge and 
expressed the view that “[i]n the case of debt cancellation agreements . . . the voluntary 
nature of the arrangement does not alter the fact that debt cancellation coverage is a 
feature of the loan affecting the total price paid for the credit.”  Truth in Lending, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 49,237, 49,239 (Sept. 19, 1996). 
 76. No. 3:04-CV-323, 2005 WL 2456963, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2005). 




“as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit.”77  The 
consumer had to pay the fee only because she could not produce the 
ticket at maturity, and the pawnbroker imposed it only because of the 
additional record keeping involved to accommodate lost tickets.78  There 
was no link between the fee and the extension of credit because the 
consumer did not have to refinance her loan when she could not produce 
her ticket.  This was akin to a charge for “actual unanticipated late 
payment, for exceeding a credit limit, or for delinquency, default, or a 
similar occurrence.”79
III.  TIMING AND FORM OF DISCLOSURES 
A.  Keeping the Disclosures 
Because Truth in Lending is a disclosure statute, a creditor is expected 
to make the necessary disclosures before consummation of a credit 
transaction.80  There is nothing unusual about that.  After all, the objective 
of Truth in Lending is to make sure that the creditor informs the 
consumer about the essential details of the credit transaction before the 
consumer is contractually bound,81 and that magical moment of commitment 
is determined not by Truth in Lending, but instead by state law.82
The regulation requires the creditor to give the consumer the disclosures 
in a form that the consumer may keep.83  The Official Staff Commentary 
explains that this requirement does not require a creditor to give the 
consumer two separate copies of the disclosure statement before 
 77. Id. at *4. 
 78. See id.; see also Pawn Broker’s Lost Ticket Fee Is Not a Finance Charge, 
CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., Nov. 2005, at 5. 
 79. Matlock, 2005 WL 2456963, at *4 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2)).  Note 
here that the defendant imposed the fee only if the consumer could not produce the 
ticket, a contingency that had nothing to do with the extension of credit.  A consumer 
may find himself in a similar situation if he pays late or becomes delinquent.  See 12 
C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(2) (2007). 
 80. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b) (2007). 
 81. TILA expresses the purpose of Truth in Lending in this way: 
It is the purpose of [Truth in Lending] to assure a meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the 
various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, 
and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and 
credit card practices. 
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000). 
 82. The Official Staff Commentary explains that “[w]hen a contractual obligation 
on the consumer’s part is created is a matter to be determined under applicable law; 
Regulation Z does not make this determination.”  12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 2(a)(13)-1 
(2007).  Regulation Z defines “consummation” as “the time that a consumer becomes 
contractually obligated on a credit transaction.”  12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13) (2007). 
 83. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a) (2007). 
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consummation.84  It is enough for the creditor to give the consumer a 
copy of the contract with the disclosures to read and sign, and then give 
the consumer a copy to keep for himself once the consumer is obligated.85  
The Commentary advises that it is not enough for a creditor to show the 
consumer the document containing the disclosures before the consumer 
signs on the dotted line.86  The consumer must be able to take possession 
of the document and review it.87  But the difficulty lies in ensuring that 
the consumer has the opportunity to do exactly as the Commentary 
suggests.  If the consumer has before him a single copy of a document 
with the disclosures, he may be in doubt about how to proceed.  If he 
signs the document and the creditor then gives him a copy, it can fairly 
be said that he had a copy of the disclosures before the transaction was 
consummated.  But that is not all that Truth in Lending requires.  The 
disclosures must be in a form that the consumer may keep.88  If the 
creditor presents the copy for the consumer’s signature, intending to give 
the consumer an unsigned copy for the consumer’s records once the 
transaction is consummated, it is questionable whether the creditor has 
met all the disclosure requirements.  It is true that in this scenario, the 
consumer will have preconsummation disclosures, but it is not altogether 
clear that he will have them at the time and in a form that he may keep. 
This was the problem that confronted the court in Polk v. Crown Auto, 
Inc.89  In Polk the creditor explained the credit terms to the consumer, 
but did not give them to him in writing in a form that he could keep 
before consummation.  The court thus had to decide whether the creditor 
had to make the disclosures before consummation in a form that the 
consumer could keep, or whether the creditor could make such disclosures 
orally before consummation and give the consumer written disclosures 
after consummation.  The creditor thought that it could make disclosures 
in any form prior to consummation, but that it had to make written disclosures 
 84. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007). 
 85. See id.  The Official Staff Commentary gives an example of how this works: 
“A creditor gives a consumer a multiple-copy form containing a credit agreement and 
TILA disclosures.  The consumer reviews and signs the form and returns it to the creditor, 
who separates the copies and gives one copy to the consumer to keep.  The creditor has 
satisfied the disclosure requirement.”  Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a). 
 89. 221 F.3d 691 (4th Cir. 2000). 




in a form that the consumer could keep only after consummation.90  It was a 
good try, but the court would not accept the creditor’s argument that 
sections 226.17(a)(1) and 226.17(b) referred to different disclosures.91  
The court accepted the plain meaning of the regulation to be that the 
creditor must give written disclosures in the form dictated by subsection 
(a)(1) at the time identified in subsection (b).92  This was a logical result, 
given the congressional intent to promote meaningful disclosure of credit 
terms so that consumers can assess their options in the marketplace.93
The creditor in Polk therefore complied with one part of the regulation 
while ignoring the other.  The preconsummation presentation of the disclosure 
form to the consumer did not really give him any time to reflect on the 
terms of the transaction.  One can only imagine the scene as the parties 
prepared to conclude the sale.  The creditor probably wanted to make 
sure that the consumer understood the details of the loan and set about in 
earnest to explain every nuance of the deal.  The terms must have been 
in writing; if not, the creditor would not have had a script with which to 
operate.  No one could therefore accuse the creditor of not making written 
disclosures.  It goes without saying that if a consumer has to sign the sales 
contract containing the Truth in Lending disclosures, then the consumer 
will have the disclosures before him, even if only for one second before 
consummation.  But that is all that the regulation requires in subsection 
(b).  Having satisfied that element, the creditor must then ensure that it 
has given disclosures to the consumer in a form that the consumer may 
keep.94  If the creditor expects the consumer to return the signed document 
to it before it returns a copy to the consumer, then one can hardly say 
that the creditor has satisfied all requirements before consummation. 
A determination about a creditor’s disclosure obligation depends in 
large measure on who determines whether the consumer may keep the 
 90. See id. at 692. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000). 
 94. Having an opportunity to read the disclosures is not the same thing as having 
an opportunity to keep them.  The court in Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 
seemed more concerned with the consumer’s reading opportunity.  See Nigh v. Koons 
Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 535, 548 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d, 319 F.3d 119 
(4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004).  The consumer in Nigh 
signed the documents immediately because he thought he would lose the chance to buy 
the truck he wanted.  See id.  So it did not matter to him whether or not he could keep a 
copy of the disclosures.  Some courts have viewed the “may keep” element in section 
226.17(a) as not subject to any preconsummation requirement.  See Padin v. Oyster Point 
Dodge, 397 F. Supp. 2d 712, 722 (E.D. Va. 2005); Haun v. Don Mealey Imports, Inc., 
285 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 2003).  This interpretation takes the sting out of 
the requirement that the consumer should be left free to review the disclosures at his own 
pace. 
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credit document before consummation.95  The expectation attributed to 
the regulatory language does not reflect the reality of everyday transactions.  
Surely a creditor does not anticipate that a consumer who has one copy 
of the credit document in front of him for signature will suddenly call for 
a delay in proceedings to contemplate the possibility of getting a better 
deal elsewhere, even if he understands the elements of the transaction that is 
near consummation.  The “may keep” language should carry more weight 
than the Official Staff Commentary gives it.96  But the Commentary is not 
alone in underestimating the importance of that phrase.  In Diaz v. Joe 
Rizza Ford, Inc., for example, the dealer used a three-copy form for the 
transaction.97  The consumer signed the top copy and the dealer then gave 
her that copy while retaining the others.98  The court saw no meaningful 
distinction between separating the copies before or after the consumer 
signed the document.99  In the court’s view, the consumer could have left 
with the unsigned document if she desired.100  But it is clear that the 
creditor did not intend the consumer to keep the retail installment 
contract containing those disclosures.  It was after all a three-copy form 
that contemplated a further exchange between the parties.  The consumer 
only found out after signing what she was going to keep after consummation.  
Once the consumer signed, the creditor found it convenient to let her 
have her copy, without any limitation on her review.  By then, of course, 
she was already committed to the transaction and there was no doubt 
then about her ability to keep what she had.101
 95. Some courts tend to reject a connection between the form and timing requirements 
of Regulation Z.  See Spearman v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 312 F.3d 848, 851 
(7th Cir. 2002); Nigh, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Queen v. Lynch Jewelers, LLC, 55 P.3d 
914, 919–20 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
 96. The Official Staff Commentary makes the point: “The disclosure requirement 
is satisfied if the creditor gives a copy of the document containing the unexecuted credit 
contract and disclosures to the consumer to read and sign; and the consumer receives a 
copy to keep at the time the consumer becomes obligated.”  12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, 
cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007).  It is arguable that the Commentary distinguishes between “reading” 
the document and “keeping” the document.  The regulation requires the consumer to 
have the opportunity to keep the document before consummation of the transaction and 
not merely at the time of consummation.  See id. § 226.17(b). 
 97. 210 F. Supp. 2d 959, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 961. 
 100. Id. 
 101. The Diaz court was satisfied that the plaintiff “was informed, and was 
protected because she took away her copy.”  Id. at 960.  But the taking by itself does not 
satisfy the requirement that the lender must satisfy the “may keep” element before 
consummation of the transaction.  See 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a), (b) (2007).  It is advantageous to 




The Diaz approach indicates that a creditor will meet the disclosure 
requirements if it shows the consumer the disclosures on the retail 
installment contract before the consumer signs, because the consumer 
always has a choice to defer consummation by leaving with the contract 
in hand.102  If the disclosure obligation ends there, it is questionable 
whether the language “in a form that the consumer may keep” has any 
room to do its work.  The drafters could have achieved this objective by 
simply requiring the creditor to make disclosures in writing to the 
consumer before consummation of the transaction, and the creditor could 
then comply merely by presenting a form to the consumer for signature.  
After all, once the disclosures are there in the contract document, the 
consumer should have nothing to complain about as long as he gets 
something to take away with him after the transaction.103  Therefore, in 
order to give full measure to the additional language in the section, it is 
reasonable to impose an obligation on the creditor to put the consumer in 
possession and control of his own copy of the document before, not 
after, consummation, so that the consumer will understand that his 
review of the document is an entirely separate event that may or may not 
lead to consummation.104
the creditor to keep together all copies of the contract document containing the 
disclosures.  It creates an opportunity for the creditor to shorten the ceremonial part 
of the transaction, while assuring the consumer that he will soon get a copy of the 
document.  In Cannon v. Metro Ford, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2002), 
the consumer alleged that the dealer deliberately covered up the disclosures with his hand 
and retained physical control of the documents.  The consumer successfully resisted the 
dealer’s motion to dismiss.  Id. at 1330.  The objection to separation of the consumer’s 
copy before any signing occurs simply contributes to the lender’s inability to emphasize 
the consumer’s right to keep the copy that is in the consumer’s hands.  See also 
Cunningham v. H.A.S., Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1168–69 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (denying 
summary judgment for dealer because of consumer’s allegations that dealer covered up 
the disclosure form that consumer signed). 
 102. See Diaz, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 960. 
 103. In Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 321 (W.D. Mich. 2000), 
the consumer signed the contract containing the disclosures, but did not get a copy until 
some weeks later.  The court held that the consumers did not get a copy in a form that 
they could keep.  Id. at 337.  The Diaz approach would dictate a finding that the dealer 
had complied with the disclosure requirement.  Following this interpretation, one would 
be unable to find any violation even if the dealer never gave the consumer a copy, 
because the preconsummation activity surrounding the consumer’s signing would take 
for granted that the consumer could always walk away with the document if he wanted 
to.  See Diaz, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 960. 
 104. The court said it best in Walters v. First State Bank, 134 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 
(W.D. Va. 2001): “Surely, the requirement of Regulation Z, as interpreted in Polk, that 
the consumer be given written disclosures, in a form that she can keep, means more than 
that the consumer must be shown the disclosures on the original credit contract prior to 
signing it.”  See also Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121, 125 (W.D. 
Mich. 2002); Lozada, 197 F.R.D. at 336–37. 
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In Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., the court read Polk as 
dealing only with the timing requirements, but not with the form of the 
disclosures.105  The Nigh court saw no objection to the disclosures being 
made in the retail installment contract between the parties, and to support its 
position it harkened back to Polk on the ground that the court there did 
not see any problem with the disclosures being made in that way.106
The Nigh court thought it was unclear from the facts in Polk whether 
the sales contract contained all the proper disclosures when the parties 
signed it.107  This characterization of the transaction allowed the Nigh 
court to focus on timing at the expense of form, thus leaving the 
impression that the Polk court had no objection to the inclusion of the 
disclosures in the sales contract.  It is clear from Polk that the creditor 
“explained” the credit terms to the consumer, the parties then signed the 
sales contract with those terms included therein, and the creditor then 
gave the consumer a copy of the contract.108  Significantly, the creditor 
in Polk conceded that it had not made the disclosures to the consumer 
before consummation in a form that the consumer could keep.109  This 
concession flowed no doubt from the creditor’s recognition of its 
preconsummation, oral explanation of the credit terms as the true moment 
of disclosure.  Having met its obligation to make its preconsummation 
disclosures pursuant to section 226.17(b), the creditor then had to worry 
about section 226.17(a) concerning the need for written disclosures in a 
form that the consumers could keep. 
The creditor had hoped that the court in Polk would read subsection 
(a) independently of subsection (b).  In this way, a creditor could make 
preconsummation disclosures which did not have to be in writing, as 
long as it made written disclosures later in a form that the consumer 
could keep.  This was not to be, for the court decided that “written 
disclosure in the form specified in subpart (a) must be provided to the 
consumer at the time specified in subpart (b).”110  This formulation left 
 105. 143 F. Supp. 2d 535, 548 (2001), aff’d 319 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on 
other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Polk v. Crown Auto, Inc., 221 F.3d 691, 691 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 109. See id. at 692. 
 110. Id.  The court followed the plain meaning of the regulation.  Id.  The plain 
meaning rule is explained this way:  “[The rule] generally means when the language of 
the statute is clear and not unreasonable or illogical in its operation, the court may not go 
outside the statute to give it a different meaning.”  2A SINGER, supra note 50, § 46:01. 




no doubt that this was more than a timing problem.  The court was 
uncomfortable with the creditor’s strategy of presenting the sales contract 
containing the disclosures for the consumer’s signature after the creditor 
had gone through the ritual of an oral explanation.  The preconsummation 
explanation seemed to constitute disclosure in some form, but the 
disappointment was that the consumer had nothing to take away with 
him.111  The writing requirement came later, but in the creditor’s scheme 
of things, the disclosures had already been made.  When the creditor 
presented the completed contract for signature, there was no inkling at 
that moment that the parties contemplated a second opportunity for the 
consumer’s reflection about the terms that the creditor had already spent 
time explaining.  Even the creditor admitted as much in Polk, for the 
question for the court was whether, in light of the creditor’s concession, 
the creditor had nevertheless satisfied Regulation Z by making the original 
disclosures orally and then following them up with disclosures in a 
form that the consumer could keep after consummation. 
B.  Separating the Copies Before or After Consummation 
One court has taken the view that “there is no meaningful distinction 
between separation of a consumer’s copy from the other copies of a credit 
contract containing the TILA disclosures before or after signature.”112  It 
is easy to disagree with that statement if one thinks that the Truth in 
Lending scheme requires meaningful disclosure.113  If it does not matter 
whether the creditor drives home the point that the consumer has his 
own copy of the disclosures for preconsummation review, then one will 
find no meaningful distinction in separating the consumer’s copy.  It 
would be acceptable, therefore, for the creditor to remain passive and 
merely hand over all the copies to the consumer in a perfunctory manner 
for his signature, without any fanfare and with the objective of bringing 
the transaction to a prompt conclusion.  It is only when the creditor gives 
the consumer the signed copy that the consumer will understand that he 
has a copy in a form that he may keep.  It is open to question whether this 
is a satisfactory solution to the lurking ambiguity when a creditor says 
nothing about the consumer’s right to keep the unsigned document.114   
 111. This is why the “disclosures” mentioned in the timing paragraph (b) must be 
construed as the same “disclosures” mentioned in paragraph (a)(1).  Compare 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.17(a)(1) (2007), with id. § 226.17(b). 
 112. Queen v. Lynch Jewelers, LLC, 55 P.3d 914, 920–21 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). 
 113. The purpose of Truth in Lending is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit 
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms 
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.”  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000). 
 114. If the creditor is deemed to fulfill its obligation at that point, and the consumer 
then signs the multicopy document, the creditor should be able to keep all the copies for 
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The Commentary’s approach, relied upon by several cases, is to place 
the burden on the consumer to show that the creditor will not allow him 
to leave with the document if he decides not to sign it.  In other words, 
there is a presumption that as a matter of principle the creditor will not 
object to the consumer’s taking away the unsigned copy for review.  
There is no good reason why this should be a matter of conjecture, 
particularly in light of the congressional objective to make the consumer 
keenly aware of the terms of the transaction that he is considering.  
Although a court should give deference to the administrative agency that 
is charged with enforcing a statute,115 the Official Staff Commentary 
itself observes that “[i]t is not sufficient for the creditor merely to show 
the consumer the document containing the disclosures before the consumer 
signs and becomes obligated.”116  But the Commentary goes on to emphasize 
that the consumer must be free “to take possession of and review the 
document in its entirety before signing.”117  The relevant inquiry, therefore, 
should be about the consumer’s freedom to take possession of the 
document.  Surely the creditor should use the document to alert the consumer 
to the fact that it intends to give the consumer free rein in deciding 
whether to move forward with the transaction.  The creditor can achieve 
this not only by giving the consumer his own copy prior to signing, but 
also by including language that is more conspicuous than any other item 
in the disclosures that confirms the consumer’s freedom to keep the 
document for review before signing it.118
itself and not be obligated to give the consumer anything.  The “may keep” requirement 
applies to the preconsummation period, because once the consumer signs, he is committed.  
In a 2002 revision of the Commentary, the Board explained that “[t]he disclosure 
requirement is satisfied if the creditor gives a copy of the document containing the 
unexecuted credit contract and the disclosures to the consumer to read and sign; and the 
consumer receives a copy to keep at the time the consumer becomes obligated.”  12 
C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007).  The consumer should have a copy to keep 
before he becomes obligated.  Courts have generally emphasized that the consumer 
received a copy of the disclosures after consummation of the transaction.  See Spearman 
v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 312 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2002); Randolph v. Joe 
Holland Chevrolet, Inc., No. Civ.A. 2:00-1132, 2005 WL 2428164, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. 
Sept. 30, 2002).  This is not really important if the preconsummation events determine 
whether the consumer has a right to keep a copy of the disclosures. 
 115. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) (mandating 
that courts give deference to the Board’s regulations when interpreting TILA). 
 116. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007). 
 117. Id. 
 118. There is nothing unusual about this kind of disclosure.  For example, a creditor 
must disclose the “annual percentage rate” and the “finance charge” more conspicuously 
than other disclosures except the creditor’s identity.  12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(2) (2007). 




The disclosure obligation raises another question about consummation: 
When does it occur? The regulation defines consummation as “the time 
that a consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction”119 
and state law determines when such an obligation arises.120  The regulation 
identifies the consumer’s commitment as the relevant event, because that 
is the time when the consumer is subject to the hazards of the creditor’s 
failure to comply with the disclosure requirements.  It is then that the creditor 
has it within its power to bind the consumer to the terms of the contract, 
and so the consumer should be advised about those terms before signing the 
contract, even though the lender’s commitment may come later.121  If it 
were otherwise, a creditor could give a consumer inaccurate disclosures, 
have the consumer commit himself, and then revise the disclosures 
before closing the transaction.122
C.  The Contingent Contract 
There is a variation on the consummation theme that merits attention.  
Sometimes the contract between the parties is contingent upon the 
consumer’s success in obtaining financing.  That was the situation in Bragg 
v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc., where the purchase contracts contained not 
only a condition precedent relative to financing, but also a provision that 
neither party would be bound until the credit terms were approved by the 
parties.123  Despite this language, the Eleventh Circuit held that “in a financing 
agreement containing a condition precedent where the condition of obtaining 
financing is within the exclusive control of the seller and third-party 
lender, consummation occurs when the consumer signs the contract.”124
This decision was a little surprising, given the Commentary’s position 
that state law determines when a consumer becomes contractually obligated.125  
In this case, neither party was contractually bound under state law until 
the dealer obtained financing for the consumer.126  Nevertheless, the 
court found that consummation had occurred, because it rejected the 
plain meaning of the regulation in order to avoid a result that it thought 
 119. Id. § 226.2(a)(13). 
 120. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 2(a)(13)-1 (2007). 
 121. See Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 319 F.3d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 2003), 
rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004); Bryson v. Bank of N.Y., 584 F. Supp. 1306, 
1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Madewell v. Marietta Dodge, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 286, 288–89 (N.D. 
Ga. 1980). 
 122. Nigh, 319 F.3d at 124. 
 123. 374 F.3d 1060, 1067 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 124. Id. at 1068. 
 125. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 2(a)(13)-1 (2007). 
 126. See Bragg, 374 F.3d at 1067. 
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would be inconsistent with the policies of Truth in Lending.127  In doing 
so, however, the court conferred a role on Truth in Lending not intended 
by Congress.  The court’s approach implied that TILA created substantive 
rights and duties for the parties, and that the court did not have to look to 
state law for a determination of the parties’ contractual obligations.  It is 
difficult to see how else the court could have arrived at its conclusion 
about the consumer’s commitment. 
The court was worried that a creditor would be protected in giving 
disclosures after the consumer had signed a conditional financing agreement.  
But disclosures that follow such a signing do not follow consummation 
if state law like that in Bragg is to be respected.  The disclosures precede 
consummation because the consumer is not yet bound to the terms of the 
arrangement.128  There is something to be said for giving a consumer an 
opportunity to consider all financing options.  But in trying to do so in 
Bragg, the Eleventh Circuit ignored both the Official Staff Commentary 
and the state law on consummation.129  This was not an argument 
about whether the consumer had preconsummation disclosures that he 
could keep, but rather whether consummation had occurred at all.  If the 
parties are not to be bound until a condition is fulfilled, then there is no 
 127. See id. at 1068 (citing Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 
1988)).  While it is true that a statute should not be read literally when that would run 
counter to its purposes, 2A SINGER, supra note 50, § 46:07, the court’s quarrel should not 
have been with Regulation Z, but rather with Florida law that recognizes the effect of a 
condition precedent.  Truth in Lending did not confer any substantive rights on the 
consumer with respect to consummation.  Allowing a lender to give disclosures after the 
consumer signs an agreement that is subject to a condition precedent will not create any 
more or less problems than allowing a lender to give the disclosures immediately before 
the consumer signs an agreement that has no conditions.  See Disclosures Required Though 
Consumer’s Signature Does Not Contractually Obligate Him, CONSUMER CREDIT & 
TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., Aug. 2004, at 4. 
 128. The focus must be on the consumer’s commitment.  A distinction must be 
drawn between a condition precedent to a lender’s obligation and that relating to a 
consumer’s obligation.  See Gaona v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th 
Cir. 2003); Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 319 F.3d 119, 124 (4th Cir. 2003), 
rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004); O’Brien v. Aames Funding Corp., 374 F. 
Supp. 2d 764, 767 (D. Minn. 2005); 10 LAPINE, supra note 61, § 174.02. 
 129. The Official Staff Commentary stipulates that “[w]hen a contractual obligation 
on the consumer’s part is created is a matter to be determined under applicable law; 
Regulation Z does not make this determination.”  12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 2(a)(13)-1.  
Under Florida law, neither party was liable under the contract until the dealer had 
assigned the contract to a third party.  See Bragg, 374 F.3d at 1067; King v. King Motor 
Co. of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., 900 So. 2d 619, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Huskamp 
Motor Co. v. Hebdon, 104 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 




consummation.130  If a creditor is allowed to give disclosures after the 
consumer signs a conditional contract, it will not impair the consumer’s 
chance to compare other financing opportunities.  Under present conditions, 
a creditor can offer its disclosures to the consumer up until the very 
moment that a consumer signs a binding document.  So, applying the 
plain meaning rule in this context does not put the consumer in any 
worse position than with an unconditional contract.131  If a consumer 
will not have an adequate opportunity to consider competing financing 
offers from other lenders under the conditional arrangement, then one 
can say the same thing about the normal financing transaction.  The 
creditor may have little or no time for reflection in either event.  The 
objective is not to change the transaction when consummation occurs, 
but rather to ensure that the consumer knows that consummation is 
imminent and that he is agreeing to the terms he sees in front of him. 
It is understandable that the court in Bragg132 relied on the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., which 
involved an unfunded financing agreement.  In Nigh, the consumer 
committed himself to the transaction and all that remained was for the 
dealer to sign off at its sole discretion if it could make an assignment to a 
lender.133  The completion of the transaction remained solely within the 
dealer’s control and did not affect the consumer’s commitment.  The 
consumer’s signature signaled his obligation to perform and the consumer 
could not thereafter change the financing terms even though the dealer 
had not yet agreed to the contract.134  The situation in Bragg was a little 
different in that neither party was bound until both parties approved the 
terms of credit.135  The Bragg court did not reject the role of the condition 
 130. It has been said that “[a] court in construing an unambiguous statute must view 
the law as it is and not as it might wish it to be.”  2A SINGER, supra note 50, § 46:02.  
The court in Bragg did not really explain how the plain meaning of the Truth in Lending 
statute was at variance with the policy of the statute.  It should have ignored the plain 
meaning only if the result produced by applying the plain meaning rule was inconsistent 
with the policies underlying the statute.  See id. § 46:02.  The court’s quarrel was really 
with the state law governing conditions.  Truth in Lending governs disclosure and not the 
time when the consumer’s commitment attaches.  See Disclosures Required Though 
Consumer’s Signature Does Not Contractually Obligate Him, supra note 127, at 5. 
 131. See Disclosures Required Though Consumer’s Signature Does Not Contractually 
Obligation Him, supra note 127, at 5.  In the same way that a creditor can give the 
consumer disclosures shortly before the consumer signs the documents, so too a 
consumer can use the time between the signing of the conditional documents and the 
funding of the transaction to engage in some comparison shopping. 
 132. Bragg, 374 F.3d at 1066. 
 133. See Nigh, 319 F.3d at 122. 
 134. The court emphasized that “Nigh, having signed the contracts and turned them 
over to Koons Buick, was committed to the transaction and obliged to perform upon 
counter-signature by Koons Buick.”  Id. 
 135. See Bragg, 374 F.3d at 1067. 
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precedent under Florida law, but instead rejected a reading of Regulation 
Z that it thought was inconsistent with Truth in Lending’s goals.136
When the Fourth Circuit returned to the consummation issue in Gibson v. 
LTD, Inc.,137 it remained true to the principles embraced in Nigh, while 
expressing satisfaction that the Bragg court had applied the Nigh court’s 
approach to consummation.138  In Gibson, the consumer could cancel the 
contract only “‘if the seller agree[d] or for legal cause.’”139  The document 
left no doubt that the consumer was bound and that he could avoid his 
obligation only if the dealer was unable to obtain outside financing “on 
terms acceptable to [the dealer].”140  Unlike the contracts in Bragg, the 
contract in Gibson did not give the consumer any power to approve the 
financing that the dealer was seeking, and therefore there was a stronger 
argument in favor of consummation.  The consumer could be released 
from liability only with the dealer’s consent, or if no financing was 
available on the dealer’s terms. 
IV.  THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION 
A.  Electing Not to Cancel 
One of the important rights that Truth in Lending confers on a consumer 
is the right to rescind a credit transaction in which the lender acquires a 
security interest in the consumer’s principal dwelling.141  The consumer 
must exercise that right before midnight of the third business day after 
consummation of the transaction, delivery of notice of the right of rescission, 
or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever comes last.142  If the lender 
fails to meet its disclosure obligations, the consumer’s right of rescission 
will continue for up to three years after consummation of the 
 136. See id. at 1068.  The court’s approach puts the emphasis not on consummation, 
but rather on the consumer’s execution of the document.  A shift from consummation to 
signing may be desirable, but it flies in the face of the regulation’s definition of 
“consummation.”  See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13) (2007).  It is the time that the consumer 
becomes contractually obligated that matters. 
 137. 434 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 138. See id. at 282. 
 139. Id. at 278 (alteration in original). 
 140. Id. at 282. 
 141. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23 (2007). 
 142. Id. § 1635(a); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3).  Regulation Z defines “material 
disclosures” as “the required disclosures of the annual percentage rate, the finance charge, 
the amount financed, the total of payments, the payment schedule, and the disclosures 
and limitations referred to in § 226.32 (c) and (d).”  12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) n.48. 




transaction.143  A lender can be quite surprised when a consumer rescinds 
long after the lender thinks that a transaction has been consummated.  
Sometimes a lender will seek reassurance that the consumer will not 
rescind by having the consumer sign a statement to that effect at the 
closing, postdating it at the same time to give some legitimacy to the 
document.144  After all, the consumer only has three days in the first instance 
to rescind if everything is in order, and the consumer’s contemporaneous 
election not to cancel serves as a protection for the lender that wants to 
wrap up a transaction without having to worry that the consumer may 
change his mind.  Nevertheless, a lender is obligated to disclose “clearly 
and conspicuously” to the consumer the right of rescission and the 
procedure for realizing that right, and this premature election not to 
cancel usually runs afoul of this requirement.145
That was the situation in Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Company, when the 
consumer signed a separate statement acknowledging her receipt of the 
notice of the right to rescind, but also at the same time confirming her 
election not to cancel the transaction.146  The ploy was destined to fail, 
for the court recognized that the lender’s presentation of the so-called 
waiver form on the day of the transaction was a pure contradiction of the 
rationale for the three-day rescission period.147  It deprived the consumer 
of the opportunity to reflect on the transaction.  It seemed that the premature 
election cancelled out the acknowledgment of the notice of the right to 
rescind and the placement of these two competing messages could only 
have confused the consumer.148  She may have thought that this was just 
part of the ritual and that she had to sign the election notice if she hoped 
to consummate the transaction. 
This election mechanism does not really give a lender any advantage.  
A lender may think that it is expediting the transaction, but the borrower’s 
certificate of nonrescission cannot be recognized as a waiver because 
Regulation Z sanctions a waiver only when the consumer has a bona fide 
personal emergency that requires an immediate extension of credit.149  In 
 143. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). 
 144. See Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 1994); 
Wiggins v. Avco Fin. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95 (D.D.C. 1999); Apaydin v. Citibank 
Fed. Sav. Bank (In re Apaydin), 201 B.R. 716, 718–19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 145. For example, if the election form states that the rescission period has expired, 
this is inconsistent with the lender’s simultaneous disclosure about the three-day rescission 
period.  See Wiggins, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 96; Apaydin, 201 B.R. at 723; Mount v. LaSalle 
Bank Lake View, 926 F. Supp. 759, 765 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 146. Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1145. 
 147. Id. at 1147. 
 148. Id. at 1146. 
 149. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(e) (2007).  The consumer’s waiver must describe the 
emergency underlying the waiver and the consumer cannot use printed forms for the 
purpose.  Id. § 226.23(e)(1).  This is intended to avoid abusive practices, while at the 
GRIFFITH.DOC 11/15/2007  8:59:09 AM 
[VOL. 44:  611, 2007]  Truth in Lending 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 639 
 
that event, the consumer must describe the emergency in a dated, 
handwritten statement.150  In Rodash, the lender presented a preprinted 
form containing boilerplate language that had no relation to the 
borrower’s financial situation, and that was not designed to drive home 
the seriousness of the decision about a waiver.151  If the objective is to 
secure a quick disbursement of funds once the three-day period expires, 
the lender can do so by having the consumer certify that he has not 
cancelled the transaction, and then simultaneously disbursing the funds 
to him.152  The Rodash scenario did not leave any room for the borrower 
to change her mind, and if perchance she had some reservations about the 
transaction the day after she signed, she might have been deterred from 
taking any action, knowing full well what she had signed.  These contrasting 
statements, both appearing on the same page, did not add up to clear 
disclosure.153
A creditor’s placement of an acknowledgment of receipt of the notice 
on the same page as a certificate of confirmation that the consumer has 
not rescinded does not automatically lead to a violation.  After Rodash, the 
Eleventh Circuit had another opportunity to consider a similar scenario 
in Smith v. Highland Bank.154  This time the notice of the right to cancel 
contained not only the consumer’s acknowledgment of receipt, but also a 
certificate of confirmation relating to noncancellation of the transaction.155  
Although the certificate of confirmation and the acknowledgment of 
receipt were on the same page, they were in separate paragraphs and 
same time making allowance for genuine cases of emergency.  See 1 PANNABECKER, 
supra note 48, ¶ 6.03[5]. 
 150. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(e)(1); see also Mills v. Home Equity Group, Inc., 871 
F. Supp. 1482, 1485–86 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that the attempted release of Truth in 
Lending claims as part of settlement claim was ineffective to waive right of rescission). 
 151. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1145 & n.2. 
 152. The lender in Morris v. The Lomas & Nettleton Co. succeeded with its quick 
disbursement strategy.  708 F. Supp. 1198, 1206 (D. Kan. 1989).  The court recognized 
that “[t]he purpose of signing the election not to rescind portion of the form prior to the 
expiration of the three days was to allow the defendant to disburse the funds quickly after 
the expiration of the three-day period.”  Id.  The court did not recognize the consumer’s 
signing as a waiver, but merely as a predated statement of an election not to rescind, 
because the lender disbursed the funds after the three-day period had expired.  Id. 
 153. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1147.  Both TILA and Regulation Z require the creditor 
to make clear and conspicuous disclosure of the consumer’s right to rescind.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1). 
 154. 108 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 155. Id. at 1326. 




were to be signed separately.156  However, in Smith the form clearly 
indicated that the consumers were not to sign the confirmation until the 
three-day rescission period had elapsed, and the certificate of confirmation 
was dated several days after the acknowledgment of receipt.157  This 
arrangement was very different from that in Rodash, where the 
consumer signed the election not to cancel on the same date as the loan 
closing, thus leaving no doubt that she wanted to waive her right to 
rescind ahead of time.158  Furthermore, in Smith there were provisions for 
two separate signatures, one acknowledging the consumer’s receipt of the 
notice of her rescission right, and the other indicating that the consumer 
had not rescinded.159  In Rodash, on the other hand, the consumer’s single 
signature covered both the acknowledgment and the confirmation.160  
Therefore, although a lender could remove all doubt about the relationship 
between an acknowledgment of receipt and a confirmation of nonrescission 
by dealing with them in separate statements and postponing presentation 
of the latter until the expiration of the rescission period, the court in Smith 
made the point that it was unnecessary to extend Rodash to accommodate 
that situation.161
The Smith court seemed to be on the right track in holding that the use 
of a form like the certificate of confirmation involved there was not a 
violation per se.162  But when the transaction goes beyond that by requiring 
the consumer’s signature in advance of the expiration of the rescission 
period, then the creditor is sowing the seeds of confusion by creating 
doubts in the consumer’s mind about the right of rescission.  It is a 
contradiction in terms for the creditor to give a notice about rescission 
and then to seek the consumer’s advance election not to rescind.   
In Adams v. Nationscredit Financial Services Corp., the confirmation 
form warranted that “more than three business days [had] passed since 
 156. Id. at 1327. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1146. 
 159. See Smith, 108 F.3d at 1327. 
 160. See Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1146. 
 161. The Smith court exercised restraint in favor of the lender this time around as a 
reaction to the seemingly harsh Rodash decision that characterized certain routine fees as 
part of the finance charge.  Following Rodash, Congress gave its own reaction to the 
harshness of Rodash by enacting certain amendments to the TILA.  See Truth in Lending 
Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271.  Congress overrode a number 
of judicial decisions with these amendments, but it did not deal specifically with an 
election not to cancel.  One might surmise that its failure to respond to that issue 
indicated its willingness to go along with the Rodash ruling on that point, but 
nevertheless the Eleventh Circuit deemed it necessary to restrict Rodash to its facts, thus 
sending a message that it wanted to exercise restraint in light of the congressional 
reaction to Rodash.  See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.4.3.8. 
 162. See Smith, 108 F.3d at 1327 n.1. 
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receipt of the Notice of Right to Cancel . . .” and further warranted that 
the consumer had not rescinded the transaction.163  Although the statement 
was untrue, consumers would still be confused about whether they still 
had a right to rescind.  This so-called warranty of no rescission that 
accompanied the notice of the right of rescission could hardly be seen to 
promote the clarity that the statute demanded.  In Adams, the lender’s 
actions were no less blameworthy simply because the confirmation did 
not bear a date.  The form did not even provide a line for the date.  That 
missing element only served to accentuate the confusion that would 
ensue from the document.164
This practice of having a consumer sign both forms at the closing is 
objectionable because a consumer may be misled into thinking that he 
can no longer rescind once he has signed the confirmation of nonrescission.165  
The form that a lender provides to accommodate a consumer’s election 
not to cancel is both “objectively false and internally inconsistent.”166  A 
lender usually places the confirmation and the notice of the right of 
rescission in the same document to produce a kind of waiver for the 
consumer.  Of course, Regulation Z prescribes the format for a waiver and 
this mechanism is not an effective substitute for the formal requirements 
of a true waiver.167  Nevertheless, the proximity of the two different 
statements leaves the consumer with the impression that he must sign on 
the dotted line if he wants to consummate the transaction.  This is what the 
creditor relies on to persuade the consumer to complete the transaction. 
Once a consumer rescinds a transaction, he cannot thereafter revive it 
by merely signing a “notice of confirmation” that is intended to reflect 
the parties’ interest in consummating a new loan.  In Chapman v. Mortgage 
 163. 351 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 164. The court observed that “[t]he average borrower who was asked to sign such a 
statement at the closing would be confused about whether he was still entitled to a three-
day ‘cooling off’ period.”  Id. 
 165. See Rodrigues v. Members Mortgage Co., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 202, 209 (D. 
Mass. 2004); Latham v. Residential Loan Ctrs. of Am., Inc., No. 03-C-7094, 2004 WL 
1093315, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2004); Wiggins v. Avco Fin. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 90, 
96–97 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 166. Wiggins, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 96.  It was contradictory for the lender to tell the 
borrower that the “cooling off” period had passed and that she could no longer rescind.  
See id. 
 167. Regulation Z stresses the significance of a waiver by requiring the signature of 
all consumers who are entitled to rescind.  See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(e) (2007).  For example, if 
two spouses use their home as collateral, both must sign the waiver.  12 C.F.R. pt. 226, 
supp. 1, cmt. 23(e)-2 (2007); see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.2.9.1. 




One Corp., the lender thought that the consumer’s notice of confirmation 
had done the trick, but the court held that TILA made no provision for 
the revival of a rescinded loan.168  In any event, the postrescission 
discussions between the parties about a new loan did not lead to any 
written documentation, and because the new loan contemplated different 
terms, it could hardly be a revival of the old loan.169  Furthermore, even 
if a common law revival was possible, the parties could accomplish it 
only by mutual consent, and there was still work to be done on the new 
terms.170
Nor did this “revival” concept work for the lender in another context.  
In Stump v. WMC Mortgage Corp., the consumer accepted the loan proceeds 
after rescinding the loan transaction and the lender argued that the consumer 
should be estopped from enforcing his rescission.171  The thinking was 
that the consumer’s conduct in accepting the proceeds had ratified or 
“re-awakened” the loan and the consumer could not be heard thereafter 
to rescind the loan.172  But the court in Stump recognized the consumer’s 
rescission as voiding the contract, making ratification thereof legally 
impossible.173
If a creditor receives a rescission notice from a consumer, the creditor 
is well advised not to ignore it.  If the creditor does not agree with the 
consumer’s rescission, its best course of action is to bring its own 
lawsuit to settle the matter.174  This approach would certainly avoid the 
possibility of a forfeiture resulting from the creditor’s inaction.175  After 
 168. 359 F. Supp. 2d 831, 833 (E.D. Mo. 2005). 
 169. See id. 
 170. A rescinded contract can be revived only by mutual consent.  See 13 SARAH 
HOWARD JENKINS, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 67.8 (2003); 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 432 
(1999). 
 171. No. Civ.A. 02-326, 2005 WL 645238, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2005). 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Abel v. Knickerbocker Realty Co., 846 F. Supp. 445, 450 (D. Md. 1994) 
(holding the creditor liable for damages for not taking steps to terminate security interest 
or at least for not seeking equitable relief before a court); Aquino v. Pub. Fin. Consumer 
Disc. Co., 606 F. Supp. 504, 509 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that the creditor was free to 
petition the court to determine rights and obligations of the parties under 15 U.S.C. § 
1635(b) (1982)); Lynch v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. of Iowa (In re Lynch), 170 B.R. 26, 
31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (finding that “defendant could have mitigated its loss had it 
moved to protect its rights in a court of competent jurisdiction within the twenty-day 
statutory period”). 
 175. See Gill v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co., 671 F. Supp. 1021, 1027 (E.D. Pa. 
1987), aff’d, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1988); Jackson v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n Tr. (In re 
Jackson), 245 B.R. 23, 34 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000); Ralls v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Ralls), 
230 B.R. 508, 524 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999); Family Fin. Servs. v. Spencer, 677 A.2d 479, 
488 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).  But see Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 575 F.2d 580, 584 
(5th Cir. 1978); Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 710 F. Supp. 143, 145–46 
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all, a court can use its modification power to respect a lender’s security 
interest, while working out an equitable solution in the context of the 
consumer’s rescission.176  If the lender has not received the consumer’s 
rescission notice, it will become aware of a problem when the consumer 
seeks to enforce his rights.  In that event, the lender will have to act on 
the rescission unless it has a basis for resisting.177  But even then, the 
lender should not be liable for its failure to respond within the statutory 
twenty-day period if it did not receive the rescission notice, and a court 
should not be reluctant to use its modification power in that event.178
If the lender has received the consumer’s rescission notice, it should 
not use dilatory tactics in dealing with the consumer’s communication.  
Regulation Z requires the lender to act within twenty days after receiving a 
notice of rescission; thus a consumer may feel that he has no alternative 
to a lawsuit if he gets no response.  In Velazquez v. Homeamerican Credit, 
Inc., the lender responded within twenty days, assuring the consumer 
that it had “initiated the rescission process,” and promising an itemized 
statement of the rescission amount.179  The lender did not keep its promise, 
and then the consumer sued not only for a declaratory judgment concerning 
rescission, but also for damages.180  The lender failed in its motion to 
dismiss the consumer’s complaint, and with good reason.181  Although the 
Commentary indicates that the lender need not complete the rescission 
(E.D. Pa. 1989); Bilal v. Household Fin. Corp. III (In re Bilal), 296 B.R. 828, 840 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 2003). 
 176. Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1992); 
Brown v. Nat’l Permanent Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 683 F.2d 444, 447–48 (D.C. Cir. 
1982); Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1980); Moazed v. First 
Union Mortgage Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 268, 272 (D. Conn. 2004); Ray v. Citifinancial 
Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 664, 668 (D. Md. 2002); Stanley v. Household Fin. Corp. III (In re 
Stanley), 315 B.R. 602, 612 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004).  But see Celona v. Equitable Nat’l 
Bank, 98 B.R. 705, 707–08 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Williams v. BankOne, Nat’l Ass’n, Tr. (In 
re Williams), 291 B.R. 636, 661 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003). 
 177. See Belini v. Washington Mutual Bank, 412 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2005); Abel, 
846 F. Supp. at 448; Bell v. Parkway Mortgage, Inc. (In re Bell), 309 B.R. 139, 154 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004).  But cf. Webster v. Centex Home Equity Corp. (In re Webster), 
300 B.R. 787, 802 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2003) (refusing to allow statutory damages for 
rescission violation when creditor promptly sought declaratory judgment). 
 178. See Wilson v. Homeowners Loan Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1219 (E.D. 
Mo. 2003); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.6.4.1. 
 179. 254 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. at 1048. 




procedure within the twenty-day period,182 the lender cannot merely 
appease the consumer with a statement that the procedure has begun and 
then sit idly by.  It must do more than that.  In Velazquez the twenty-
day period expired without the lender doing anything more, and the 
consumer waited patiently for some response.183  But if there was any 
doubt about what the lender had in mind, its initial letter removed that 
doubt with the lender’s promise to release its mortgage when the consumer 
paid the rescission amount.184  The lender conditioned its performance 
on the consumer’s return of the mortgage funds, and ignored the statutory 
prescription to carry out the consumer’s rescission.185  Furthermore, it was 
well nigh impossible for the consumer to fulfill the lender’s conditions if 
the lender did not see fit to provide an itemized statement of the rescission 
amount, as it had promised.  The consumer therefore had standing to 
pursue her claim.186
Despite the lender’s inaction, the court was keen to point out that its 
ruling did not mean that the lender would forfeit the loan proceeds.187  
This was certainly in keeping with the judicial trend to avoid forfeiture 
 182. With respect to the creditor’s action to terminate the security interest, the 
Commentary makes this point: “The 20-day period for the creditor’s action refers to the 
time within which the creditor must begin the process.  It does not require all necessary 
steps to have been completed within that time, but the creditor is responsible for seeing 
the process through to completion.”  12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 23(d)(2)-3 (2007). 
 183. The creditor notified the consumer on December 17, 2002, that it was agreeing 
to rescind the consumer’s loan.  The creditor’s letter indicated: “You will receive a letter 
shortly containing an itemized statement of the rescission amount.  Upland will release 
its mortgage simultaneously with, or otherwise upon receipt of, payment of the rescission 
amount.”  Velazquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1044.  When the consumer filed suit on January 
14, 2003, she still had heard nothing further from the creditor.  Id. 
 184. The creditor promised to release its mortgage when it received payment.  See id. 
 185. The court emphasized that the creditor could not unilaterally impose its will on 
the rescission process by making the consumer pay before it rescinded the loan.  See id. 
at 1047.  The consumer had given signs of its unwillingness or inability to perform.  See 
id.  If the creditor disrupted the consumer’s right to rescind, it could have sought a 
judicial declaration of its rights and obligations.  See Aquino v. Pub. Fin. Consumer Disc. Co., 
606 F. Supp. 504, 508 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also Lynch v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. of 
Iowa (In re Lynch), 170 B.R. 26, 31 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (finding that “the defendant 
could have mitigated its loss had it moved to protect its rights in a court of competent 
jurisdiction within the twenty-day statutory period”). 
 186. Velazquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.  The court compared the situation in 
Velasquez with that in Personius v. Homeamerican Credit, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 817, 
819 (N.D. Ill. 2002), where the creditor actually produced the itemized statements it 
promised to the consumer and did so within ten days.  Velazquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 
1047.  Nevertheless, the consumer in Personius filed suit two days after requesting 
rescission, that is, within the statutory twenty-day period allowed for the creditor’s 
performance.  Personius, 234 F. Supp. 2d at 819.  The court in Personius denied the 
consumer standing to sue for rescission in light of these factors.  See id. at 820. 
 187. See Velasquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. 
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whenever possible,188 but the court was also mindful of its authority to 
modify the rescission procedure if that was necessary to protect the 
lender.189  But the lender could not unilaterally decide to impose its own 
will on the consumer, particularly when the consumer had not given any 
indication of his unwillingness to perform.  If a lender is worried about a 
consumer’s ability or willingness to perform,190 it should seek a court’s 
intervention to delay a release of the mortgage until the consumer repays 
the amount that is due on rescission. 
B.  Ambiguity in Language 
When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the creditor must “return any 
money or property that has been given to anyone in connection with the 
transaction . . . .”191  The consumer is not liable for any finance charge 
when he rescinds, and the creditor has to refund to the consumer any 
amount that is recognized as a finance charge.192  The creditor must also 
refund all other charges even if the creditor is allowed to include them in 
the amount financed, rather than the finance charge.193  If the consumer 
incurred costs outside the credit transaction such as for a building permit 
or a zoning variance, the creditor is not responsible for refunding these 
costs.194  If the charge is a lock-in fee, however, the creditor must refund 
 188. See Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 575 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(allowing recovery of damages for violation but not forfeiture of loan proceeds); 
Mayfield v. Vanguard Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 710 F. Supp. 143, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1989) 
(holding that where there is no fraud by lender and no tender of proceeds by consumer, 
consumer must return loan proceeds to lender); Bell v. Parkway Mortgage, Inc. (In re 
Bell), 314 B.R. 54, 60–61 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2004) (refusing to order forfeiture where 
lender could not tell from documentation that the consumer did not get the required 
rescission notice); Bilal v. Household Fin. Corp. III (In re Bilal), 296 B.R. 828, 839 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (holding that consumer’s only remedy for lender’s failure to 
tender is damages and lender does not forfeit right to recover amounts due from 
consumer). 
 189. See Velasquez, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. 
 190. See id. 
 191. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(2) (2007). 
 192. See Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 705 (9th 
Cir. 1986); Milbourne v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Milbourne), 108 B.R. 
522, 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989). 
 193. For example, if the creditor meets certain criteria, it may include credit insurance 
premiums in the amount financed, rather than in the finance charge.  See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(1) 
(2007).  Certain security interest charges may also be excluded from the finance charge, 
but they must also be refunded to the consumer.  See id. § 226.4(e). 
 194. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 23(d)(2)-2 (2007); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW 
CTR., supra note 4, §  6.6.4.2. 




it if the consumer rescinds.  The creditor in Jones v. E*Trade Mortgage 
Corp.195 had an agreement with the consumer to refund the lock-in fee 
only if the creditor did not approve the loan because of credit problems.196  
The creditor wanted to treat the lock-in fee agreement as a separate 
transaction that was not related to the right of rescission under the 
loan.197  The Ninth Circuit rejected the creditor’s argument because the 
lock-in agreement was part of the application for credit and was simply 
one of the several steps in obtaining a loan.198  It also did not matter that 
the consumer could not have obtained a refund if the loan did not 
close.199
In Sampanetti v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., the court took a different 
tack by recognizing that the refund language in the lock-in agreement 
applied only when the loan did not close.200  It was left to speculation, 
therefore, whether the refund issue related to postclosing events.  The creditor 
had dutifully used the Board’s model rescission form, and no more could 
have been expected of it on that score.201  It remained, therefore, for the 
court to explain that the rescission and refund provisions do not apply 
when a loan has not yet closed.202  It seemed unlikely that there was a 
contradiction between the lock-in agreement and the notice of the right 
to rescind.  The lock-in agreement dealt only with rescission of an 
application, whereas the notice related to a loan after it closed.  It is 
 195. 397 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 196. The lender’s application loan checklist provided that the lender “would verify 
property value, property conditions . . . and certain other information,” and if the lender 
did not approve the loan for closing, the lock-in fee would be refunded.  Id. at 813–14. 
 197. See id. at 813. 
 198. See id.; NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 6.6.4.2; Problems with 
the Non-Refundable Lock-in Fee, CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE 
REP., May 2005, at 1, 1–2. 
 199. The court made short shrift of the creditor’s argument by stating that it was 
“irrelevant to this case.”  Jones, 397 F.3d at 813. 
 200. No. 02-C-3513, 2002 WL 31478269, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2002).  The lock-
in agreement stated in pertinent part: 
If you provide [ETrade] with all documentation requested of you (within 3 
calendar days) to complete the underwriting review of your loan application . . . and, 
following such review,  [ETrade] does not approve your loan for closing, based 
on income qualifying or credit, the lock-in fee will be refunded to you.  If your 
loan fails to close for any other reason ( [sic] including your decision to cancel 
the application, then the lock-in fee will not be refunded to you. 
Id. at *1 (alterations in original). 
 201. See id. at *2.  The Board has published certain model disclosure forms that 
creditors can use for their closed-end transactions.  Among them is the rescission model 
form.  See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, app. H-8 (2007). 
 202. Sampanetti, 2002 WL 31478269, at *2.  One usually thinks of the right of rescission 
as related to the closing or consummation of the transaction.  It is one of the events that 
must occur for a consumer to be able to rescind.  See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2007).  In 
Sampanetti, the court was dealing with a lock-in fee relating to the consumer’s 
application, not consummation.  See Sampanetti, 2002 WL 31478269, at *1. 
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arguable, therefore, that Truth in Lending does not require the refund of 
a lock-in fee if a loan fails to close, but that does not affect a consumer’s 
right to a refund if the loan closes and the consumer rescinds the transaction.203
A consumer’s complaint about ambiguity and contradiction may arise 
in other contexts.  In Hamm v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., the consumer 
was displeased because the lender did not adequately inform her of her 
right of rescission.204  It was the lender’s generosity that led to this complaint, 
because the lender gave the consumer not only the statutory notice 
explaining the three-day period for rescission, but also a separate form 
that provided for a one-week cancellation period in accordance with the 
lender’s policy.205  The one-week form reiterated the consumer’s right to 
rescind under federal law, but then explained in a separate paragraph the 
lender’s policy to give one week for rescission, so that a consumer 
would have more time to review the documents.206  It was not clear how 
the one-week form negated the statutory three-day notice, but the consumer 
tried to convince the court of the inevitable confusion that would ensue 
by exposing the consumer to both.207  It was to no avail in the court’s view, 
because an ordinary customer would understand that the one-week 
cancellation option was merely a goodwill gesture that did not detract 
from the regulatory language.208
Nevertheless, there may be more to this than meets the eye.  The court 
in Jones v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. recognized the problems that might 
ensue from a creditor’s generosity in giving a consumer a longer period 
to rescind.209  Once the consumer goes beyond the three-day period, there is 
no guarantee that he will be entitled to remedies like damages or attorney’s 
fees.210  This was sufficient for the court in Jones not to grant summary 
judgment to either party.211  The two rescission notices could confuse the 
 203. See Problems with the Non-Refundable Lock-in Fee, supra note 198, at 1. 
 204. No. 05-C-227, 2005 WL 2405804, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005). 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. at *3. 
 207. See id. at *2. 
 208. This was enough for the court to grant summary judgment to the creditor.  Id. 
at *4.  The court held that “no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Ameriquest’s 
disclosures regarding the right of recision were inadequate under TILA.”  Id. at *3. 
 209. No. 05-CV-0432, 2006 WL 273545, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2006). 
 210. See id. 
 211. In denying summary judgment, the court observed: 
A reasonable fact finder, then, could conclude that, for an ordinary consumer, 
the One-Week form detracts from the clarity of the federal form in that the 
One-Week form purports to be a mere extension of the TILA right but does not 




borrower about the consequences of choosing one method of rescission 
over the other, for if the consumer decided to rescind sometime between 
the third day and the seventh day in accordance with the creditor’s 
policy, she might place herself at a disadvantage if she could not benefit 
from the statutory benefits that would accrue under normal circumstances.212
If a creditor wishes to be more liberal about rescission than the 
regulation demands, it should make it quite clear that the consumer will 
continue to enjoy all the rights and privileges conferred on him by Truth 
in Lending, and that the creditor is merely extending the time for the 
consumer to act.  The lender must be careful not to call the clarity of its 
disclosure into question by informing the consumer of the three-day 
period for rescinding and then giving an expiration date for rescission 
that is inconsistent with that period.  The creditor’s objective must be to 
avoid conflicting dates that may lead to a finding that the creditor has 
not given clear and conspicuous disclosures.213
C.  Termination of the Right 
If a lender fails to live up to its responsibility, the right of rescission 
can continue for three years.214  However, the right will expire before 
that time if the consumer sells the property.215  The “sale” contemplated 
by the statute occurs at the time of contract, rather than later at the time 
explain the differences, if any, in the rescission rights.  Indeed, a fact finder is 
needed to determine whether those differences exist. 
Id. at *8. 
 212. A similar situation arose in Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 109 F. Supp. 
2d 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 2000), where the creditor notified the consumer that he could 
cancel within one day as allowed under state law, but also gave the rescission notice 
required under Truth in Lending for canceling within three days.  The court concluded 
that the two different periods that the creditor mentioned for rescission rendered the 
TILA rescission notice unclear and therefore extended the rescission period for three 
years.  Id. at 361; see also Porter v. Mid-Penn Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Porter), 961 
F.2d 1066, 1077 (1992) (finding the H-8 form used by the creditor did not give consumer 
clear notice of the right to rescind in a refinancing transaction); Gibbons v. Interbank 
Funding Group, 208 F.R.D. 278, 284 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that rescission form was 
misleading because creditor used the wrong form); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra 
note 4, § 6.4.3.7.  But see Haw. Cmty. Fed. Credit Union v. Keka, 11 P.3d 1, 13 (Haw. 
2000) (finding that no prejudice results to the consumer when the creditor gives the 
consumer more than the statutory three-day period to rescind). 
 213. Regulation Z requires a creditor to make disclosures “clearly and conspicuously.”  
12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(1) (2007).  A creditor may have difficulty not only by providing 
two different rescission periods, but also by committing other errors such as failing to fill 
in the expiration date for rescission.  See Semar v. Platte Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 
F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1986); Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 768 (5th Cir. 
1983); Reynolds v. D & N Bank, 792 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (E.D. Mich. 1992). 
 214. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2007). 
 215. Id. 
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of conveyance.216  Setting the earlier contract time as the cut-off for 
rescission carries out the congressional policy of avoiding a cloud on 
title.217  A later date can have a negative impact on the rights of purchasers 
and lead to litigation.  Adopting the earlier time avoids these possibilities 
and settles matters for the parties to the transaction.218
The result should not be any different if a consumer rescinds and then 
sells the property.  In that event, a consumer cannot continue to press for 
rescission, because the sale terminates the right to rescind.  Therefore, 
when the consumers in Meyer v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. sold their home 
while their rescission lawsuit was pending, the sale terminated the consumers’ 
right to rescind.219  The Meyer court made it clear that the Hefferman 
pronouncement—that the consumer in the latter case should have sent 
her rescission notice before contracting to sell her property—did not 
mean that if an actual sale occurred, a rescission notice that preceded the 
sale would be valid.220  The Meyer court thought it necessary to clarify 
the point that the time when a consumer rescinds does not control for all 
intents and purposes.  So, a presale rescission notice will cease to be 
effective once a sale occurs.221
The Official Staff Commentary advises that “a foreclosure sale [will] 
terminate an unexpired right to rescind.”222  There is authority for the 
position that a sale is not complete until the consumer’s right to redeem 
has expired,223 but in Marschner v. RJR Financial Services, Inc., the court 
 216. See Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 1989); Dailey v. Leshin, 
792 So. 2d 527, 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 217. See 1972 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. ON TRUTH IN LENDING, reprinted in 119 
CONG. REC. 4596–97 (1973). 
 218. See Dailey, 792 So. 2d at 531–32; Weber v. Langholz, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 
681 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 219. 331 F.3d 1028, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 342 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
 220. See Meyer v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 342 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 221. See id.  The Meyer court treated as dictum the suggestion of the court in 
Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1989), that the rescission notice that the 
consumer sent prior to contracting for sale of the property would have been effective.  Id. 
at 900. 
 222. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 23(a)(3)-3 (2007). 
 223. See Bestrom v. Bankers Trust Co. (In re Bestrom), 114 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 
1997); Walker v. Contimortgage (In re Walker), 232 B.R. 725, 732 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1999).  But cf. Worthy v. World Wide Fin. Servs. Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507–08 
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that right of rescission terminated even though redemption 
period had not ended); Aames Funding Corp. v. Mores, 110 P.3d 1042, 1049–50 (Haw. 
2005) (finding that nonjudicial foreclosure sale made deed valid and not affected by 
attempted rescission thereafter). 




explained that the consumer’s right of redemption was not an interest in 
land, but rather a legal right created by statute.224  Therefore, the foreclosure 
sale cut off the consumer’s right to rescind.  But the court also pointed 
out that, even if the consumer’s right of rescission continued through the 
redemption period, the consumer did not exercise his right in time 
because his filing an action for rescission with the court before the 
redemption period expired did not constitute notice to the lender of the 
consumer’s rescission.225  That notice came days later when the consumer 
served the lender with a summons in the suit for rescission.226
Regulation Z recognizes that the consumer’s extended right to rescind 
can expire even before three years have gone by if the consumer transfers 
all his interest or when he sells the property.227  This suggests that sales 
and transfers are two distinct events, and the Commentary states that “[a] 
sale or transfer of the property need not be voluntary to terminate the 
right to rescind.”228  It was this language that led the court in Worthy v. World 
Wide Financial Services, Inc.229 to conclude that, although a foreclosure 
sale may not always transfer all of a consumer’s interest because of the 
redemption feature, it always terminates the consumer’s right of rescission.230  
The court would not ignore the Board’s reasonable construction of the 
regulation and preferred to give an ordinary meaning to the phrases 
“foreclosure sale” and “transfer of all of the consumer’s interest.”231  It was 
another victory for judicial deference to administrative interpretation, for 
the Commentary left little doubt about the effect of a foreclosure sale.232
A consumer’s right of rescission may be called into question in another 
context: when a consumer tries to rescind a mortgage after paying it off.  
In an early post-TILA case, the Ninth Circuit denied the consumer the 
right to rescind after the consumer refinanced her loan, on the ground that 
there was nothing to rescind.233  Nevertheless, both the Sixth Circuit234 and 
the Seventh Circuit235 have recently disagreed with the Ninth Circuit 
by emphasizing that there is a difference between merely rescinding a 
 224. 382 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (E.D. Mich. 2005). 
 225. Id. at 922. 
 226. Id. 
 227. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2007). 
 228. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 23(a)(3)-3 (2007). 
 229. 347 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507–08 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
 230. See id. at 507; see also Foreclosure Auction Is a “Sale” Ending Right to Rescind, 
CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., Mar. 2005, at 4. 
 231. Worthy, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 507. 
 232. See id. 
 233. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1986).  The consumer was 
trying to rescind a loan that she had already refinanced.  See id.  Thus, the lien resulting 
from that loan was superseded by the later loan.  See id. 
 234. Barrett v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 445 F.3d 874, 880 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 235. Handy v. Anchor Mortgage Corp., 464 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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security interest and rescinding a transaction.236  Although a rescission will 
void a security interest,237 it also requires a lender to return any money or 
fees generated by the transaction.238  Therefore, it is not only the security 
interest that is in play here, but also the fees and other charges that the 
consumer may have paid on consummation of the transaction. 
Although a consumer will normally have three days after consummation 
to rescind, that period can extend as long as three years if the lender does 
not give the consumer a notice of the right to rescind, or if the lender 
makes a mistake with its material disclosures.239  Nevertheless, even this 
extended right to rescind will end during that three-year period if the 
consumer transfers the interest in his home or sells the property, whichever 
happens first.240  There is nothing in TILA or Regulation Z that allows 
another event, like a pay-off or refinancing of the transaction, to extinguish 
the consumer’s right of rescission.241  The consumer’s payment of the 
loan will result in a termination of the lender’s mortgage lien, but it will 
have no impact on the consumer’s right to seek reimbursement of the 
charges that he could have avoided if the loan had not closed in the first 
place.242  This is why the Sixth Circuit emphasized in Barrett v. JP Morgan 
 236. See id. at 765; Barrett, 445 F.3d at 880. 
 237. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1) (2007).  Although the statute 
and the regulation both suggest that the security interest becomes void automatically 
when a consumer rescinds, there is considerable authority for a court to modify the 
rescission procedures and condition the removal of the lender’s lien on terms that are just 
and equitable.  See, e.g., Am. Mortgage Network, Inc. v. Shelton, 486 F.3d 815, 821 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that “unilateral notification of cancellation does not unilaterally void 
the loan contract” and that unconditional rescission was inappropriate where borrowers 
could not repay loan); Yamamoto v. Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding that security interest becomes void only when “the right to rescind is 
determined in the borrower’s favor” and that a court may consider rescission on borrower’s 
tender); Williams v. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 1992) 
(“[A] court may impose conditions that run with the voiding of a creditor’s security interest.”); 
Ruiz v. R & G Fin. Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 318, 322 (D.P.R. 2005) (conditioning rescission on 
the borrower’s tender of loan proceeds). 
 238. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1)–(2). 
 239. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Regulation Z provides: “If the required notice or material disclosures are not 
delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after consummation, upon transfer of 
all the consumer’s interest in the property, or upon sale of the property, whichever occurs 
first.”  Id. 
 242. It is a matter of returning to the status quo ante.  See Handy v. Anchor Mortgage 
Corp., 464 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2006); Barrett v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 445 
F.3d 874, 880 (6th Cir. 2006); Quenzer v. Advanta Mortgage Corp. USA, 288 B.R. 884, 
888 (D. Kan. 2003).  This is one way of protecting the consumer’s right to recover his 




Chase Bank, N.A. that the right of rescission applies to the transaction 
itself, and not merely to the security interest.243  So, even though a lender 
may no longer have a security interest, the consumer still has the right to 
seek a return of finance charges and other costs in the transaction if the 
consumer is to enjoy all the incidents of the extended right of rescission.244
V.  THE CHANGE IN TERMS 
A.  Change in Fees or APR 
It is not unusual for a lender to include in its credit agreements a 
provision that allows it to change the terms thereof at a later time.  But a 
lender must express this right to change the terms of the credit agreement in 
a way that does not detract from disclosures that reflect the legal obligation 
of the parties.245  The disclosures must be clear and conspicuous, so that 
a consumer will have the opportunity to make a meaningful comparison 
between the credit terms available from various lenders.246  When the 
disclosures indicate that a consumer will have to pay no annual fee once 
he signs up for a credit card, they play a significant role in attracting new 
customers to the lender.  If the lender tries later to impose an annual fee, 
the customer may find that there is a provision somewhere in the credit 
card agreement that allows the lender to do so. 
A consumer found herself in that predicament in Rossman v. Fleet 
Bank (R.I.) National Ass’n.247  The lender sent the consumer an information 
leaflet that indicated there was no annual fee attached to the credit 
card.248  Nevertheless, the lender listed other fees outside the disclosure 
box and also indicated that it reserved the right to change the benefit 
transaction charges when the consumer’s right of rescission continues for three years 
because of the lender’s failure to comply, regardless of whether there has been a refinancing 
or not. 
 243. Barrett, 445 F.3d at 880; see also NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4,   
6.3.2.3 (Supp. 2006). 
 244. See Barrett, 445 F.3d at 880; Pacific Shore Funding v. Lozo, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
283, 291 (Ct. App. 2006); see also Two Appellate Courts Say That TILA Rescission 
Right is NOT Extinguished Upon Refinancing, NCLC REPS., CONSUMER CREDIT & 
USURY EDITION, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 17. 
 245. Regulation Z requires that “[d]isclosures shall reflect the terms of the legal 
obligation between the parties.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(c) (2007). 
 246. See generally id. § 226.5(a) (describing general disclosure requirements for 
open-end credit). 
 247. 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 248. See id. at 387.  The consumer information leaflet contained a table of basic 
credit card information in the so-called Schumer Box, named in honor of Representative 
(now Senator) Schumer, who was the principal sponsor of the House bill that led to the 
amendment of the Truth in Lending Act.  See Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, § 2, 102 Stat. 2960, 2960–66. 
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features of the card at any time.249  When the consumer received her 
credit card agreement, it contained the following provision: “No annual 
membership fee will be charged to your account.”250  However, the 
agreement also contained a change-in-terms provision that the lender 
used later to impose an annual fee.251  The issue was whether the lender 
had violated the Act by misleading consumers with its “no-annual fee” 
credit card.  The answer to that question depended on the meaning of the 
cardholder agreement.  If the agreement did not allow the “no annual fee” 
pledge to be changed before the end of the first year, the lender’s disclosure 
was satisfactory.  If the agreement allowed such a modification, then the 
disclosure constituted a violation, and the only way for that to be determined 
was for the court to remand the case for the district court’s consideration. 
If the cardholder agreement gave the bank the right to impose an annual 
fee, the lender’s solicitation materials were misleading.  A reasonable 
consumer could read the solicitation language as rejecting an annual fee 
for at least one year.252  The consumer should expect to have a year’s use 
of the card without paying any fee, and therefore the lender’s statement 
to the contrary was misleading.  In the court’s view, the lender’s use of the 
“no annual fee” terminology was not a clear and conspicuous disclosure 
that permitted the lender to assess a fee before one year had expired.253  
Although the lender did not have an obligation to disclose the change-in-
terms provision under the Act, it had an obligation to disclose annual 
fees and the “no annual fee” statement was misleading with respect to the 
duration of the offer.254  Thus, if the cardholder agreement permitted the 
 249. See Rossman, 280 F.3d at 388. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See id. at 394.  Professor Epstein read that result as “an eminently sensible effort to 
make commercial sense of an agreement, by using the term ‘annual’ in the disclosure 
form to benchmark the duration of the promise.”  Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral 
Economics: Human Errors and Market Correction, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 126 (2006). 
 253. See Rossman, 280 F.3d at 394.  The court viewed the agreement as ambiguous 
at best because “[i]nterpreting the statement with an implied annual term [was] as natural 
as interpreting it with no such term.”  Id.  Such ambiguity should be resolved in the 
consumer’s favor because the Act should be construed liberally as a consumer protection 
statute because of its remedial nature.  Roberts v. Fleet Bank, 342 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 
2003); Begala v. PNC Bank, Ohio, N.A., 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1998); Ellis v. GMAC, 
160 F.3d 703, 707 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 156 
F.3d 499, 502 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 254. There is a difference between having an obligation to disclose a change-in-terms 
provision and an obligation to disclose annual fees.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(1)(A)(ii)(I) 
(2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(2) (2007). 




lender to assess a fee before one year had gone by, the lender had an 
obligation to clarify the issue if it hoped to meet Truth in Lending 
requirements.255
On the other hand, if the agreement did not permit the lender to impose a 
fee, the original disclosure would have been consistent with the subsequent 
agreement and therefore would not have violated the Act.256  There would 
be nothing misleading under such circumstances because the disclosure 
would have reflected the terms of the account that the lender was offering.  
This is why the court in Rossman remanded for a determination about the 
false or misleading nature of the disclosure.  It all depended on the meaning 
of the agreement.   
A change-in-terms provision can also lead to other difficulties.  If a 
lender intends at the time of its disclosure to impose a fee later, it is 
questionable whether the lender should be free from liability simply because 
the agreement did not contemplate an annual fee.  In a credit card solicitation, 
the disclosures which the lender gives to the consumer usually reflect the 
terms covered by the agreement between the parties.  A consumer would 
not expect the lender to make certain disclosures, but then not advise the 
consumer that the disclosed terms would not last very long.257  The 
 255. In Rossman the solicitation disclosure indicated that the lender had the right to 
change the card’s benefit features.  See Rossman, 280 F.3d at 388.  The disclosure also 
contained a list of benefits, such as free rental car insurance and free year-end account 
summary, but said nothing about other features like lack of an annual fee.  See id. at 394 
n.10.  All of this information was provided outside the Schumer Box and the lender’s 
right to change any of the so-called benefits did not give a consumer any clue that an 
annual fee was covered by the benefits language. 
 256. In Demando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 2000), the credit card company 
originally offered the consumer a permanent, fixed rate and later tried to increase it through a 
change-in-terms clause contained in the agreement.  The court concluded that the notice 
of the rate change violated TILA because it disclosed a rate that was not permitted under 
the agreement.  Id. at 1303.  In Rossman, the consumer did not claim that the letter about 
the change in terms itself violated TILA.  The TILA claim was viable only if the 
agreement between the parties allowed the lender to impose an annual fee.  See Rossman, 
280 F.3d at 395.  The determination about the false or misleading nature of the “no-
annual fee” promise depended on an evaluation of that part of the agreement that the no-
annual fee statement purported to disclose.  See id.  The Rossman court read the lender’s 
language as at least preventing the lender from imposing any fee for a year.  See id. at 
394; see also Epstein, supra note 252, at 126. 
 257. It has been said that these change-in-terms provisions detract from Truth in 
Lending’s purpose of providing effective disclosure of credit terms.  Many consumers 
probably fail to grasp the meaning of these provisions.  See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
THE COST OF CREDIT § 11.7.2.4 (3d ed. 2005).  In construing a change-in-terms provision one 
court took the following view: 
The Change in Terms provision is reasonably limited to terms previously 
contemplated by the original agreement, so long as cardholders do not accept 
the unilateral change by continuing to use their cards.  Otherwise, credit card 
holders would find themselves in an Orwellian nightmare, trapped in agreements 
that can be amended unilaterally in ways they never envisioned. 
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intention not to extend credit on the disclosed terms puts the consumer in 
an untenable position.  In the classic bait-and-switch situation, a consumer 
may be able to detect that the terms which a lender initially proposed are 
not the same that it is asking the consumer to accept once consummation 
approaches.258  A consumer has the last clear chance to reject the transaction 
before consummation and thus stop the lender in its tracks before the 
damage has been done.259  At least in such a case, a consumer has little to 
complain about once the lender makes the disclosures before consummation. 
On the other hand, when a consumer enters into a contract with the 
lender without knowing that a change in the annual fee is imminent, he 
is at a serious disadvantage if he commits without being aware of the 
lender’s intentions.260  When the change occurs, the consumer may be heavily 
in debt to the lender and may not be able to pay off his debt immediately 
to avoid new terms that the lender knew was in the offing, but that the 
consumer did not anticipate.  The Official Staff Commentary recognizes 
that, when a card issuer offers fees that are reduced or waived for a 
certain period, it must disclose the fee that will apply indefinitely, and 
Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 2004 WL 1508518, at *14 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004) 
(footnote omitted). 
 258. In Clark v. Troy & Nichols Inc., 864 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1989), the court 
recognized the bait-and-switch possibilities but did not see Truth in Lending as providing 
a remedy.  The court observed that “[t]he fact that [the lender] may not have intended to 
loan money under the stated terms does not make [its] disclosures with respect to the 
stated terms inaccurate.”  Id. at 1264.  There is no Truth in Lending violation in the “spot 
delivery” transaction where a dealer enters into a sales contract with a consumer at a low 
interest rate, knowing full well that the consumer will not qualify for the low rate, but 
nevertheless giving the consumer possession of the car in anticipation of qualifying the 
consumer for a higher rate once the original credit application is rejected.  See Janikowski v. 
Lynch Ford, Inc. 210 F.3d 765, 769 (7th Cir. 2000).  Nevertheless, there is a potential for 
abuse in spot delivery transactions.  See Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. 220 
F.R.D. 64 n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 2004); Rucker v. Sheehy Alexandria, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 711, 
719 (E.D. Va. 2002); Mayberry v. Ememessay, 201 F. Supp. 2d 687, 695 (E.D. Va. 
2001). 
 259. The Rossman court distinguished Clark v. Troy & Nichols, 864 F.2d 1261 (5th 
Cir. 1989), this way: 
Clark was a classic bait-and-switch case.  The plaintiff there was first attracted 
by a deceptive offer.  Having obtained his audience, the lender attempted to 
switch the offer to a set of terms more favorable to itself and less favorable to 
the borrower.  All of this occurred before the consummation of an agreement.  
Clark was able to, and chose to, refuse the switch based on accurate disclosures. 
Rossman, 280 F.3d at 397 (emphasis added). 
 260. The deception about the lender’s intentions may be even more troublesome 
than inaccurate disclosures.  A consumer cannot get into the lender’s mind to ascertain 
the true state of affairs.  See Clark, 864 F.2d at 1266 (Thornberry, J., dissenting). 




may disclose introductory rates only if it also indicates the period for 
which such rates are applicable.261  If the lender has an obligation to set 
out the applicable rates in this situation, the same rule should apply 
when the lender harbors secret intentions to apply a fee where there was 
none before.  It is surely misleading for a card issuer to solicit a consumer 
with a “no annual fee” or a low-rate pledge, and then promptly implement 
its secret strategy through a change-in-terms provision.262
Another example of the mischief caused by such a provision came in 
Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.).263  This time the disclosure box—otherwise 
known as the Schumer Box264—in the solicitation materials assured the 
consumer of a 7.99% APR with the prospect of a change only if the 
consumer failed to meet any repayment requirements or he closed the 
account.265  The cardholder agreement which the consumer later received 
repeated the same information in one provision, but in another stipulated 
that the creditor reserved the right to change the terms of the agreement 
at any time.266  The question was whether the bank had clearly and 
conspicuously disclosed its right to change the APR, given the inconsistency 
between the information about the APR in the solicitation material and 
the bank’s disclosure of its right to change the APR. 
In reversing the district court and remanding for further proceedings, 
the court recognized that there was a material question of fact as to 
whether the bank had misled the consumer with its solicitations, and thus 
failed to live up to its responsibility to provide clear and conspicuous 
disclosures.267  A reasonable consumer could conclude that the bank 
 261. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp.1, cmt. 5a(b)(1)1-5 (2007). 
 262. It has been said that “these expansive change-in-terms provisions deprive 
consumers of any ‘benefit of bargain’ and thus undermine the TILA’s purpose in ensuring 
effective disclosure.”  Carolyn Carter et al., The Credit Card Market and Regulation: In 
Need of Repair, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 23, 49 (2006).  The authors go on to suggest that 
changes in terms should not be allowed in credit card contracts.  Id. at 51.  In some cases 
consumers are at the mercy of the creditor because state law may allow a creditor to 
change the terms of the agreement even without a change-in-terms clause.  See NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 257, § 11.7.2.4 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) 
(2005)). 
 263. 342 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 264. For an explanation of the Schumer Box, see id. at 263 n.1; Greisz v. Household 
Bank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1039 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1998); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra 
note 4, § 5.4.2.2 & n.190. 
 265. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 263. 
 266. Id. at 264. 
 267. Id. at 269.  Congress had hoped to encourage clear and transparent disclosures 
in the credit card industry by enacting the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, § 2, 102 Stat. 2960, 2960–66.  The Senate Report indicated 
as follows: 
    It is estimated that U.S. consumers will receive over 2,400,000,000 solicitations 
for credit cards in 1987.  Unfortunately, far too many of them do not disclose 
the basic cost information about the card.  By law, such information need not 
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could change the APR only under the two specific conditions identified 
in the disclosure, and thus there was a question of fact about the adequacy 
of the bank’s disclosures amidst conflicting language elsewhere that the 
bank could change the terms at any time.  It is true that the bank could 
not legally include the change-in-terms provision in the disclosure box, 
but the question was whether the bank had properly disclosed the APR, 
and not whether it had properly disclosed that provision.268
Although Truth in Lending’s requirements of clarity and conspicuousness 
apply to disclosures in the initial disclosure statement and the disclosure 
box,269 this does not prevent a court from examining other statements that a 
creditor makes in its solicitation materials in order to decide whether a 
credit card issuer has complied with Truth in Lending requirements.270  
This is understandable, for a creditor might scrupulously follow the 
be disclosed until the consumer actually receives the card.  Moreover, the information 
consumers receive with the cards covers the entire credit relationship and is often 
complicated and intimidating.  While consumers are legally entitled to return the 
cards without incurring any charges if they are dissatisfied with the terms, the 
situation is obviously not conducive to comparison shopping.  This lack of disclosure 
at the time of application or solicitation may help explain why credit card 
profits remain so high despite the large number of card issuers. 
    The Committee believes that early disclosure of relevant cost information, 
coupled with widespread publication of the costs of different cards will help 
remedy the problem of enabling consumers to shop around for the best cards.  
The resulting competition should be good for both consumers and competition. 
S. REP. NO. 100-259, at 2–3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936, 3938. 
 268. The lender sought refuge in the fact that it could not legally include the 
change-in-terms provision in the Schumer Box.  See Roberts, 342 F.3d at 269.  But the 
Schumer Box disclosed that the rates could be changed for two reasons only, and the 
court was really concerned about the adequacy of the APR disclosure.  See id. at 266.  
The defendant’s counsel admitted the likelihood of an inconsistency in the language, 
thus giving substance to the argument that a reasonable consumer might find the 
materials confusing and misleading.  See id. at 268 n.4. 
 269. See 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a), (c) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(1) (2007). 
 270. It would be difficult to achieve Truth in Lending’s ultimate objective to require 
meaningful disclosure if a lender could ignore its obligations for any disclosure outside 
the Schumer Box.  The Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act was intended to give 
consumers the necessary information for comparing the terms for credit cards available 
in the market place.  See Roberts, 342 F.3d at 268.  A lender should not be free to make 
misleading statements just because they are not literally false.  See Rossman v. Fleet Bank 
(R.I.) Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384, 390–91 (3d Cir. 2002); Taylor v. Quality Hyundai Inc., 
150 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 975 (5th Cir. 
1980).  It is important for courts to consider the entire picture in deciding whether a 
lender has met the clear and conspicuous disclosure requirement, particularly when 
credit card agreements are relatively complex and pose a challenge to the average 
consumer.  See Ronald J. Mann, “Contracting” for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REV. 899, 907 
(2006). 




disclosure requirements after misleading a consumer with statements in 
its solicitation materials.271  Thus, the prescription for the disclosure box does 
not shield credit card companies from liability for placing misleading 
information outside the box.  The consumer in Roberts must have been 
delighted with the bank’s promise that the interest rate being offered was 
not an introductory rate and that “it won’t go up in just a few short 
months.”272  She must have been assuaged also by the disclosure that the 
APR could be raised only under two conditions.  The disappointment came 
later in the cardholder agreement with the change-in-terms provision.  
By then the consumer had fallen prey to the card issuer’s solicitation, 
and the only question was whether this occurred because of the lack of 
clarity and conspicuousness on the card issuer’s part.273  Although the 
consumer’s focus in cases like this may be on the Schumer Box, the card 
issuer should not be allowed to send mixed messages with conflicting 
language elsewhere, whether it is in the solicitation materials or in the 
cardholder agreement.  A consumer who relies on the possibility of a change 
in terms under limited circumstances should not fear sudden confrontation 
with an open-ended clause that includes other possibilities.  After all, 
Truth in Lending was designed to grant such protection to consumers in 
the marketplace. 
A change-in-terms provision does not give a creditor free rein to 
change an agreement in any way it sees fit.  Normally any modification 
is binding only if the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed to it.  
When a creditor makes changes that relate to terms such as the finance 
charge, rates, and credit limits, it is easier to fit the change within the 
 271. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 gives 
added protection to a consumer when the lender offers temporary or introductory rates.  
The lender must disclose in its solicitation materials the circumstances under which the 
lender may change its temporary APR and also indicate the APR that will apply 
thereafter.  See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 1303(a), 119 Stat. 23, 210 (amending Truth in Lending Act § 127(c), 15 
U.S.C. § 1637(c) (2000)); NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 5.4.3.2.2. 
 272. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 263.  The lender in Roberts used to mail the cardholder 
agreement containing information about rate changes after the consumer accepted the 
card.  This was another element that put the consumer at a disadvantage.  In any event, 
the issue still remained whether the cardholder agreement with the rate change language 
contradicted the teaser language in the introductory materials.  The defendant’s lawyer 
admitted that “arguably there [was] an inconsistency.”  Id. at 268 n.4.  This seemed to be 
a concession that a reasonable consumer could find the materials confusing and 
misleading.  See id. 
 273. Section 127(c) of TILA, amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, mentions at least four times the clear and conspicuous 
requirement for disclosing the conditions affecting introductory rates.  See Pub. L. No. 
109-8, § 1303(a), 119 Stat. 23, 210 (2005) (amending TILA § 127(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c) 
(2000)); see also SHEILA M. WILLIAMS, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005: LAW AND EXPLANATION § 6303 (2005). 
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latitude granted by the change-in-terms provision.274  This is so because 
the matters that are subject to change are already contained in the original 
agreement, and it is reasonable to expect that the parties had those 
conditions in mind when they consummated the agreement.  However, 
when the creditor seeks to introduce new features into the agreement, the 
consumer may feel that the change-in-terms provision does not support 
such an approach. 
B.  The Arbitration Clause 
In recent times, questions have been raised about the introduction of 
an arbitration clause into an agreement through the change-in-terms 
provision.275  An arbitration clause is not akin to a finance charge, or 
a periodic rate, or a payment term.  It relates instead to the resolution of 
disputes between the parties, and therefore it is arguable that it adds a 
new term to the agreement that was not in contemplation of the parties at 
the time of consummation.   
The court in Badie v. Bank of America certainly took this view of the 
arbitration clause, and from the perspective of contract interpretation, gave 
the new clause the emphasis it deserved because the original agreement 
contained nothing of the sort.276  It was not sufficient, therefore, for the 
lender merely to follow the prescribed procedure for modifying the 
contract unilaterally if the modification was not consistent with the 
subject matter covered by the contract.277  The Badie court observed the 
importance of good faith and fair dealing between the parties and 
rejected the proposition that there was no limitation on the nature of the 
 274. Regulation Z recognizes the importance of a consumer knowing about changes 
in the terms of credit.  See 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) (2007).  Thus, the lender must give 
written notice of a change in any term that had to be disclosed originally when the lender 
solicited or opened the account.  See id; see also Ralph J. Rohner & Thomas A. Durkin, 
TILA “Finance” and “Other” Charges in Open-End Credit: The Cost-of-Credit 
Principle Applied to Charges for Optional Products or Services, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. 
REV. 137, 145–46 (2005).  It is different when a lender simply introduces new terms that 
have no relation to anything contained in the original disclosures. 
 275. See Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 198 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 284 (Ct. App. 1998); 
Discover Bank v. Shea, 827 A.2d 358, 361 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Rashmi 
Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract: Evolving Paradigms for Regulating Consumer 
Credit, 73 TENN. L. REV. 303, 331 & n.178 (2006); Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. 
Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 174 & n.86 (2006). 
 276. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 289 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 277. See id. 




substantive changes that the bank could make unilaterally.278  In this 
respect, the lack of any limitation on the change-in-terms provision bordered 
on the illusory nature of the contract, for a creditor could implement any 
changes it wanted without having to worry about the original terms that 
cemented the arrangement in the first place.279  Any such implied limitation 
might be found in the universe of terms employed by the parties in the 
original agreement.  Therefore, when an agreement covers matters that 
are integral to the bank-customer relationship like credit limits, finance 
charges, and late charges, and says nothing about a collateral matter like 
arbitration, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties did not intend to 
cover that topic in the original agreement. 
In Badie, the agreement allowed the creditor to change any term, and 
some courts have construed that authority to change as not including 
additions to the agreement.280  This was a way of explaining the Badie 
decision.  But the important consideration in Badie was whether the bank 
could change terms, and not whether it could add new ones.281  Some 
 278. The court made the point: 
Where . . . a party has the unilateral right to change the terms of a contract, it does 
not act in an “objectively reasonable” manner . . . when it attempts to “recapture” a 
forgone opportunity by adding an entirely new term which has no bearing on 
any subject, issue, right, or obligation addressed in the original contract and 
which was not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was entered into. 
Id. at 284 (quoting Lazar v. Hertz Corp., 191 Cal. Rptr. 849, 857 (Ct. App. 1983)); see 
also Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated 
Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1698 (2006). 
 279. The Badie court observed that to avoid the label of illusoriness, it had to 
recognize some implied limitation on the change-in-terms provision.  See Badie, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 285.  That limitation could be found by restricting any change to “the 
universe of terms included in the original agreements.”  Id.  The court recognized this as 
the objective determinant that, when combined with the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, produced the limitation.  See id.  It is not unusual for courts to look for these 
elements in trying to save an agreement that might otherwise be suspect when one party 
seems to have the discretion of performing or not performing.  See 1 E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.13 (3d ed. 2004). 
 280. It is open to question whether a change in terms should also include an 
addition.  In Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), the 
lender modified its change-in-terms provision to allow it to “add” as well as “change” 
any terms.  Id. at 427.  The court construed the provision against the lender as the drafter 
of the instrument and construed it “as limiting any changes to modification of existing 
terms—a construction that is also consistent with contract principles, reasonable 
expectations, and the requirement of good faith.”  Id. at 434. 
 281. The controversy in Badie revolved around the meaning of “change.”  The court 
was skeptical that “change” meant “add” in this context.  It explained: 
Not only does using the somewhat legalistic word “amend” to define the 
garden-variety word “change” appear to run counter to the spirit of section 1644, 
but the conclusion that “change” was intended to mean “add” is questionable 
in light of the fact that the phrase stating that the Bank could “add” new terms 
had been deleted from the revised version of the change of terms provision in 
the account agreements in effect when the ADR bill stuffer was mailed. 
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courts have agreed with Badie even when the credit agreements have 
permitted additions or accommodated the consumer’s interest in opting 
out of the agreement.282  The important issue was that the agreement 
made no mention of dispute resolution, and the consumer had no inkling 
that the creditor’s unilateral action could subsequently obliterate his 
right to seek relief in a judicial forum.  One court was concerned that the 
change-in-terms provision could have unlimited application beyond 
arbitration, and the consumer’s failure to object under these circumstances 
could not be interpreted as consent to the new term.283
Nevertheless, consumers have not always prevailed in the battle of 
terms.  In Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, the court was not sympathetic to the 
consumer’s claims of procedural and substantive unconscionability.284  
Although the cardholder agreement was rather lengthy, it did indicate 
that the creditor could amend it from time to time by notifying the 
consumer, and there was no limitation on the bank’s power to do so.285  
The notification gave the consumer the option of rejecting the arbitration 
provision,286 and the court viewed this as an important feature of the 
arrangement because it identified this option as one of the elements 
missing in Badie.287  But the court in Badie seemed more concerned with 
the kind of terms that the creditor was trying to impose on the consumer, 
and that was relevant to the terms that the parties contemplated at the 
time of their agreement.288
Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285.  The court also had to consider the “terms” that the parties 
had in mind in their original agreement.  See id. at 285–86. 
 282. See Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A.04-507, 2004 WL 1508518, at 
*2–5 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004); Myers v. MBNA Am. & N. Am. Capitol Corp., No. CV 
00-163-M-DWM, 2001 WL 965063, at *3–5 (D. Mont. Mar. 20, 2001). 
 283. See Perry, 2004 WL 1508518, at *3–5; see also Stone v. Golden Wexler & 
Sarnese, P.C., 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197–98 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  But see In re Am. Express 
Merchs. Litig., No. 03-CV-9592(GBD), 2006 WL 662341, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 
2006). 
 284. 125 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001). 
 285. See id. at 826. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. at 833 (citing Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
 288. The Badie court made this point about the change-in-terms provision: 
All the provisions of the original credit account agreements concerned matters 
that were integral to that relationship.  In this context, there is nothing about 
the original terms that would have alerted a customer to the possibility that the 
Bank might one day in the future invoke the change of terms provision to add a 
clause that would allow it to impose ADR on the customer. 
Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287. 




The court in Bank One found that the notice about the arbitration 
clause was clear and that it was unlikely to cause the consumer any 
difficulty, as it addressed the simple topic of arbitration.289  On the issue 
of substantive unconscionability, the consumer had the burden of showing 
that he would have to bear unreasonable costs in the arbitration setting.290  
He could not merely make that assertion and hope to prevail without 
evidence to that effect.  Furthermore, a consumer would not be denied any 
remedy by submitting himself to arbitration, since an arbitrator could 
grant any relief that was available under substantive law. 
The acceptance of the change-in-terms provision depends in large measure 
on whether it is viewed from the perspective of unconscionability or 
from a lender’s authority to amend the agreement in this way.  The latter 
approach leads to interpretation of the contract between the parties.  That 
interpretation depends inevitably upon the parties’ intent, but where the 
contract is ambiguous, it should be construed against the drafter.  The 
change-in-terms provision in Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C. was 
typically broad because it allowed the bank to “amend or change” any part 
of the agreement and to “add or remove requirements” at any time.291  
One could not have hoped for broader language than that, but nowhere in 
the agreement was there any mention of arbitration.  The court sided with 
Badie in looking at the change-in-terms clause to determine the universe 
of terms affected by it, but it could find only references to annual 
percentage rate, periodic rates, fees, and other charges.292  By interpreting 
the contract in this way, the court tried to avoid any allegations of illusoriness 
by preserving the elements of the bargain between the parties.   
It is understandable that the court would take this approach; a court 
should concentrate on the kind of terms that the change-in-terms provision 
is intended to affect.  If the provision purports to affect something that 
was totally outside the parties’ contemplation at the time of their agreement, 
it runs counter to the idea that there should be a meeting of the minds for 
 289. The consumer had hoped to persuade the court on the issue of procedural 
unconscionability because “the circumstances surrounding the addition of the arbitration 
provision to the parties’ alleged contract were so unfair as to compel a conclusion that 
there was no voluntary meeting of the minds.”  Bank One, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 830.  The 
theory was that the small paragraph dealing with a change in terms gave no inkling of the 
possible addition of an arbitration provision.  See id. at 830–31.  This aspect of procedural 
unconscionability results from “an absence of meaningful choice.”  1 FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 279, § 4.28. 
 290. It is true that the possibility of large arbitration costs could conceivably prevent 
a consumer from vindicating his statutory rights through arbitration.  But a party must 
come forward and show that he is likely to incur such costs.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp. 
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 291. 341 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 292. See id. at 197–98. 
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the parties to be bound.293  A change, whatever it is, should not come as 
a total surprise to the consumer, and it would be indeed, if it did not fall 
within that universe of terms covered by the agreement.  As a matter of 
principle, the agreement should be construed against the creditor in this 
situation, and any ambiguity about the change-in-terms provision should 
be resolved in the consumer’s favor.294  There is surely a great disparity in 
the parties’ bargaining power, and an ambiguous contract that is a product of 
the creditor’s handiwork should not be construed against the consumer.  
Furthermore, a resolution of the problem should not depend upon whether 
the change that is the subject of contention is labeled an addition, alteration, 
or merely a change.  The focus should be on the kind of term that the 
creditor is seeking to introduce.295
 293. The Badie court identified the main issue as follows: 
Our focus is on whether the words of the original account agreements mean 
that the Bank’s customers, by agreeing to a unilateral change of terms provision, 
intended to give the Bank the power in the future to terminate its customers’ 
existing right to have disputes resolved in the civil justice system, including 
their constitutionally based right to a jury trial.  In our view, the object, nature 
and subject matter of these agreements strongly support the conclusion that the 
customers did not so intend, and that they, as promisors with respect to the 
change of terms provision, had no inkling that the Bank understood the 
provision differently. 
Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 288 (Ct. App. 1998). 
 294. This technique, contra proferentem, allows a court to construe an ambiguous 
provision in a contract against the drafter.  See 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 24.27 (rev. ed. 1998).  For example, in Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 
the court construed the provision under consideration as allowing the lender either “(1) 
to modify only those terms already contained or contemplated in the original Agreement, 
or (2) to both modify and insert additional, previously uncontemplated, terms to the 
original agreement.”  No. Civ.A.04-507, 2004 WL 1508518, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 
2004).  Recognizing the lender as being in the stronger bargaining position in relation to 
the consumer, the court construed the ambiguous language against the lender as the 
drafter, and held that the unilateral change-in-terms provision applied only to terms 
contemplated in the original agreement.  Id. 
 295. Compare In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., No. 03-CV-9592(GBD), 2006 WL 
662341, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006) (“The change-in-terms clause . . . when coupled 
with other terms in the . . . contracts, rendered the arbitration amendment . . . a reasonable 
addition to the original contracts.”), with Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 
F. Supp. 2d 189, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that since the contract did not mention 
any terms relating to dispute resolution, the arbitration agreement was not within the 
universe of terms covered by the change-in-terms provision), and Union Planters Bank v. 
Rogers, 912 So. 2d 116, 120 (Miss. 2005) (finding no agreement on arbitration in 
absence of notice and negotiation of arbitration endorsement), and Maestle v. Best Buy 
Co., No. 79827, 2005 WL 1907282, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2005) (finding no 
meeting of the minds about including arbitration clause when contract formed).  An 
arbitration provision can have a profound impact on the parties’ agreement.  If the 




VI.  THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES 
A.  The Statutory Limits 
Except as otherwise provided, the statute in its current form imposes 
civil liability on a creditor that violates any provision.296  A consumer 
may recover both actual damages and statutory damages.297  In the case 
of statutory damages, a consumer does not have to show any detrimental 
reliance, because the purpose of the statute is to give a creditor an incentive 
to comply with the statutory requirements by allowing a consumer to act 
as a private enforcer.298  It is not even necessary for a consumer to show 
that the creditor knew about the violation or that the consumer was 
misled by the creditor’s conduct.299
When Congress passed TILA in 1968, it provided for statutory damages 
of twice the finance charge, but it set a minimum recovery of $100 and a 
maximum of $1000.300  A 1974 amendment provided for the recovery of 
actual damages in addition to statutory damages, and also added a 
arbitration itself is in dispute, a court may adjudicate the claim, but an arbitrator makes 
the decision about the contract itself.  See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967).  The severability rule applies even when there is a 
claim that the contract containing the arbitration clause is void for illegality because of a 
usurious interest rate.  Thus, the Supreme Court ruled in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. 
Cardegna that the arbitrator must rule on any such challenge because it went to the 
validity of the contract as a whole, and for that purpose there is no distinction between 
voidness and voidability.  546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006). 
 296. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2000). 
 297. Id. § 1640(a)(1), (2). 
 298. See Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 442–43 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1142, 1148 (11th Cir. 1994); Jones v. TransOhio 
Sav. Ass’n, 747 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1984); Bizier v. Globe Fin. Servs., 654 F.2d 1, 
2 (1st Cir. 1981); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Fin. Co., 630 F.2d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 
1980); Recovery of Damages Statutory and Compensatory, CONSUMER CREDIT & TRUTH-
IN-LENDING COMPLIANCE REP., May 2005, at 6. 
 299. See Zamarippa v. Cy’s Car Sales, Inc., 674 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1982); 
Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980); Dzadovsky v. Lyons Ford Sales, 
Inc., 593 F.2d 538, 539 (3d Cir. 1979); Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 
444, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Haw. Cmty. Fed. Credit Union v. Keka, 11 P.3d 1, 18 (Haw. 
2000). 
 300. The section governing statutory damages in 1968 provided in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails . . . to disclose 
to any person any information required . . . to be disclosed to that person is 
liable to that person in an amount equal to the sum of 
(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the 
transaction, except that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less 
than $100 nor greater than $1,000; and 
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, 
the costs of  the action together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as 
determined by the court. 
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. 1, § 130(a), 82 Stat. 146, 157 (1968). 
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separate provision for class actions.301  The separate subparagraph 
for statutory damages in an individual action maintained the previous 
$100/$1000 limits.  A further amendment in 1976 added a clause dealing 
with consumer leases and restricted recovery thereunder to “25 per centum 
of the total amount of monthly payments under the lease,” but the language 
dealing with the $100/$1000 limits then followed both clause (i) dealing 
with other consumer transactions and clause (ii) dealing with consumer 
leases.302  After the 1976 amendment relating to consumer leases, it was 
generally agreed that the $100/$1000 limits applied to all consumer 
transactions—both non-lease transactions in clause (i) and lease transactions 
in clause (ii).303
Had there been no further amendments, there would hardly have been 
any difficulty with § 1640(a)(2)(A).  But that was not to be, for Congress 
amended the section again in 1995 by adding a new clause (iii) dealing 
with statutory damages for violations in closed-end transactions secured 
by real property or a dwelling, and setting the $200/$2000 limits for such 
violations.304  The section now had a clause (i) and clause (ii) followed by 
 301. The 1974 amendment converted the old paragraph (1) of the 1968 statute into a 
new paragraph (2) with two parts, (A) and (B).  In order to accommodate this new 
framework, Congress had to change the word paragraph to subparagraph.  The new 
section then read as follows: 
(2)(A) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance 
charge . . . except that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be less 
than $100 nor greater than $1,000; or 
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may allow . . . and 
the total recovery in such action shall not be more than the lesser of $100,000 
or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor . . . . 
Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1517, 1518 (emphasis 
added). 
 302. After the 1976 amendment, the statute allowed statutory damages as follows: 
(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance charge in 
connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the case of an individual action 
relating to a consumer lease . . . 25 per centum of the total amount of monthly 
payments under the lease, except that the liability under this subparagraph shall 
not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000 . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975), amended by Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-240, § 4(2), 90 Stat. 257, 260. 
 303. See Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995); 
Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983); Dryden v. 
Lou Budke’s Arrow Fin. Co., 661 F.2d 1186, 1191 n.7 (8th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Pub. 
Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 359 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 304. Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, § 6, 109 Stat. 
271, 274. 




the $100/$1000 limits, and clause (iii) followed by the $200/$2000 limits.305  
In light of the previous consensus that the $100/$1000 limits applied to 
both clauses (i) and (ii), the question then became whether the addition 
of clause (iii) wrought a change in the statute’s interpretation so that the 
limits should thereafter apply to clause (ii) only, because the language 
restricted it to “this subparagraph,” or whether it should apply to both clauses. 
The Supreme Court answered the question in Koons Buick Pontiac 
GMC, Inc. v. Nigh when a consumer was trying to recover under clause 
(i) for a creditor’s violation in a consumer transaction.306  The Court 
acknowledged that the purpose of the 1995 amendment was to establish 
a more generous limit for closed-end mortgages, but that there was no 
congressional intent to repeal the accepted $100/$1000 limits in clause 
(i).307  Before 1995, clause (i) covered closed-end mortgages and the 1995 
amendment merely carved out such mortgages for special treatment in a 
new clause (iii) with respect to minimum/maximum limits.308  The Court 
could find no evidence that Congress intended to change the pre-1995 
interpretation that applied the $100/$1000 limits to the entire class of 
consumer credit transactions captured by clauses (i) and (ii), which at the 
time also included closed-end mortgages.309
The Court chose not to rely solely on the statutory language, for then 
it would have had to deal with the literal meaning of the word 
“subparagraph” in clause (ii).310  In this context, the word could hardly have 
covered all of subparagraph (A) in light of the separate restriction for 
closed-end mortgages contained in clause (iii).311  The Court was left then 
with the alternative of examining the statutory history and interpretative 
sources to glean congressional intent.  Although Justice Stevens concurred, 
he thought it quite plausible to read clause (i) as prescribing the amount 
 305. Id. 
 306. 543 U.S. 50 (2004). 
 307. See id. at 63. 
 308. Clause (iii) now provides that a consumer may recover “in the case of an 
individual action relating to a credit transaction not under an open end credit plan that is 
secured by real property or a dwelling, not less than $200 or greater than $2,000.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000). 
 309. See Koons, 543 U.S. at 62.  The House Report clarified that “this amendment 
increases the statutory damages available in closed end credit transactions secured by 
real property or a dwelling.”  H.R. REP. NO. 104-193, at 99 (1995). 
 310. The Court explained that “[t]he word ‘subparagraph’ is generally used to refer 
to a subdivision preceded by a capital letter, and the word ‘clause’ is generally used to 
refer to a subdivision preceded by a lower case Roman numeral.”  Koons, 543 U.S. at 61. 
 311. There was no disagreement that Congress meant to establish a more generous 
scheme for closed-end mortgages.  See id. at 62 (citing Strange v. Monogram Credit 
Card Bank of Ga., 129 F.3d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1997)).  This did not mean, however, that 
Congress intended to remove the accepted $100/$1000 limits in § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) and 
apply such limits only to § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii).  See id. 
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of damages without setting minimum/maximum limits.312  Nevertheless, 
he saw a way out of the “unambiguous statutory command” not by alleging 
that an absurd result would ensue, but by using common sense.313  That 
approach led him to the statutory history which made it clear that 
Congress did not intend to tamper with the pre-1995 interpretation that 
applied the limits to both clauses (i) and (ii).314  Justice Stevens did not 
regard himself, therefore, as constrained by any canon of statutory 
construction that allowed him to examine only legislative history for the 
resolution of ambiguities or the avoidance of absurdities.  He was perfectly 
content to look at the whole picture in order to determine the place of the 
word “subparagraph” in clause (ii).315
It was not surprising that the Court applied the $100/$1000 limits to 
both clauses (i) and (ii).  After all, there was no disagreement about the 
pre-1995 meaning of the section,316 and Congress did not materially alter 
the text of clauses (i) or (ii) when it amended the statute in 1995 to 
accommodate a cap on closed-end mortgages.  After the amendment, the 
statute remained ambiguous, as the reference to “subparagraph” could no 
 312. See id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 313. Justice Stevens made his point as follows: “Common sense is often more 
reliable than rote repetition of canons of statutory construction.  It is unfortunate that 
wooden reliance on those canons has led to unjust results from time to time.  Fortunately, 
today the Court has provided us with a lucid opinion that reflects the sound application 
of common sense.”  Id. at 65–66.  Justice Stevens supported the majority’s holding even 
though he found the statute unambiguous.  Id.  The Court saw an ambiguity and therefore 
looked to resolve it by examining the rest of the statutory scheme, including the statutory 
history.  See id. at 60–62 (majority opinion). 
 314. See id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 315. On this point Justice Stevens acknowledged that “it is always appropriate to 
consider all available evidence of Congress’ true intent when interpreting its work 
product.”  Id.  In doing so, Justice Stevens interprets a statute in a way that implements 
congressional purpose even at the risk of departing from the statute’s semantics.  The 
opinions of the other Justices are to be contrasted with that of Justice Scalia who, in his 
dissent, gave a good example of the textualist approach by giving “dispositive weight to 
the structure of § 1640(a)(2)(A), which indicates that the exception is part of clause (ii) 
and thus does not apply to clause (i).”  Id. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Thus, Justice Scalia 
was not keen to consider the statute’s purposes even on the pretext of rescuing Congress 
from its drafting mistakes.  See id. at 76 (citing Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 
542 (2004)). 
 316. See Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996); Cowen v. 
Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1995); Mars v. Spartanburg 
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow 
Fin. Co., 661 F.2d 1186, 1191 n.7 (8th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 
349, 359 (5th Cir. 1979). 




longer apply to all of subparagraph (A).317  It was this ambiguity that led 
the Court to the statutory history and the previous judicial interpretation 
of the pre-1995 versions.  The Court’s examination of the overall statutory 
scheme318 led to the conclusion that Congress had enacted a “scrivener’s 
error” into law.319  Although some members of the Court favored always 
looking at all available evidence of congressional intent, even when there 
seems to be no ambiguity in the statute,320 the Court found solace in the 
statutory history because it detected an ambiguity.321  It was a matter of 
ascertaining whether Congress intended in 1995 to do something other than 
merely adding clause (iii) to place a minimum/maximum cap on damages in 
closed-end mortgage transactions.  Congress left things as they found them 
in 1995 after adding that clause, and that was enough to convince the 
Court that the $100/$1000 limits should apply to both clauses (i) and (ii). 
B.  Violations Covered 
Disagreement over the liability section has arisen in other contexts.  
The statute requires a creditor to make certain disclosures in closed-end 
transactions and also dictates the form and timing of those disclosures.322  
The civil liability section imposes liability, except as otherwise provided, on 
 317. Congress could have removed the ambiguity by stating in clause (ii) “liability 
under this clause” instead of “liability under this subparagraph.”  That would have left no 
doubt that Congress intended to apply the $100/$1000 limits to consumer leases only.  In 
reaching a sensible solution to the problem, the Court viewed clause (iii) as merely removing 
closed-end mortgages from clause (i)’s coverage only because clause (iii) provides $200/$2000 
limits instead of 100/$1000 limits.  See Koons, 543 U.S. at 62.  The Court took a holistic 
approach in construing the statute by examining the statutory scheme, rather than 
looking at the statutory language in isolation.  See id. at 60; see also Jonathan T. Molot, 
The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 n.174 (2006). 
 318. See Koons, 543 U.S. at 63. 
 319. Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 320. Justice Breyer joined with Justice Stevens in suggesting that “it is always 
appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress’ true intent when interpreting 
its work product.”  Id. 
 321. See id. at 62 (majority opinion).  In trying to come to some reasonable understanding 
of the statute’s meaning, the Court looked to Congress’ goals in enacting the statute.  
One commentator explains the difference between textualists and purposivists in this 
context.  Professor Manning explains that “textualism means that in resolving ambiguity, 
interpreters should give precedence to semantic context . . . rather than policy context . . . .”  
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 
110 (2006).  With respect to purposivism, “the dictates of legislative supremacy obligate 
the interpreter to help the legislature realize the statute’s overarching goals.”  Id.  The 
Court in Koons seemed to come down on the side of the purposivists, with Justice Scalia 
advocating for the textualist approach.  Compare Koons, 543 U.S. at 62, with id. at 73 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  For a discussion of the difference between the two camps, see 
Molot, supra note 317; Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005). 
 322. See 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a), (b) (2000). 
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a creditor that fails to comply with the disclosure requirements.323  The 
section then goes on to say that in connection with the closed-end disclosures, 
a creditor will have liability only for failing to comply with the disclosure 
requirements of certain paragraphs of § 1638(a).324  Therefore, not all 
disclosure failures will lead to statutory damages against a creditor.  Section 
1638(b) prescribes the form and timing requirements of disclosures for 
closed-end transactions, but § 1640 does not say what will happen if a 
creditor violates § 1638(b).325  Here is where the disagreement arises.  The 
question is whether § 1640 limits statutory damages to the violations 
specifically mentioned, or whether the section provides general liability 
for noncompliance in the absence of a specific exemption. 
TILA stipulates that, except as otherwise provided, a consumer may 
recover both actual and statutory damages if a creditor fails to comply 
with any requirement.  In Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., the 
consumers alleged that the creditor had not given them the required  
disclosures before it extended credit, thus becoming liable for statutory 
damages by violating § 1638(b)(1).326  This set the stage for an interpretation 
of § 1638(b)(1) because § 1638(b)–(d) were not “disclosures referred to 
in section 1638” and thus did not fall within the exception to statutory 
damages covered in § 1640(a).327  Section 1640(a) identifies the specific 
disclosures in § 1638(a) that attract statutory damages in case of a violation, 
but because § 1638(b) is not a disclosure section, the court could not find 
any support for excluding a § 1638(b) violation from eligibility for 
statutory damages.328
 323. See id. § 1640(a). 
 324. The statute provides as follows: 
In connection with the disclosures referred to in section 1638 of this title, a 
creditor shall have a liability determined under paragraph (2) only for failing to 
comply with the requirements of section 1635 of this title or of paragraph (2) 
(insofar as it requires a disclosure of the “amount financed”), (3), (4), (5), (6), 
or (9) of section 1638(a) of this title . . . . 
Id. 
 325. The specific sections mentioned in § 1640(a) are § 1635 and § 1638(a).  See id. 
 326. 145 F. Supp. 2d 878, 882 (W.D. Mich. 2001). 
 327. Id. at 889. 
 328. The court explained as follows: 
The only “disclosures referred to in section 1638” are contained in subsection 
1638(a), which is entitled, “Required disclosures by creditor.”  Of the disclosures 
mentioned in 1638(a), only the enumerated numbers are subject to statutory 
damages.  No dispute exists that statutory damages are not available for disclosures 
referred to in § 1638(a) that are not listed—that is, §§ 1638(a)(1), (2) (in part), 
(7), (8), and (10)–(14). 




In Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., the Seventh Circuit took a 
different tack on this issue by disallowing statutory damages for a violation 
that did not appear in § 1640(a).329  This time the court concentrated on 
the word “only” in the paragraph which allows damages “only for failing 
to comply with the requirements of section 1635 . . . or of paragraph (2) 
(insofar as it requires a disclosure of the ‘amount financed’), (3), (4), (5), 
(6), or 9 of section 1638(a).”330  The court viewed the identification of 
the violations as a “closed list” that could not be judicially expanded to 
accommodate the consumer’s complaint about the creditor’s dereliction.331
In Baker v. Sunny Chevrolet, Inc., the Sixth Circuit joined the Seventh 
Circuit in rejecting statutory damages for a § 1638(b)(1) violation.332  
The court viewed the statute as creating two types of violations: 
(1) complete nondisclosure of the stipulated items in § 1638(a), and 
(2) disclosure of such items, but not in the manner required by      
§ 1638(b)(1).333  The court treated the violation in (1) as eligible for statutory 
damages, but not the violation in (2).334  But the court went further than 
that by holding that § 1640(b) protected the creditor because the creditor 
had corrected its error by making the necessary disclosures within sixty 
days after discovering it.335  It was surprising that the court opted to apply 
this correction of error defense to a situation where the creditor failed to 
provide disclosures prior to consummation, because the defense is normally 
entertained only for disclosures that the lender has already made, not for 
those that it has failed to make.336  Any other interpretation would allow 
a lender to avoid the form and timing requirements of § 1638(b) by 
Id. at 888. 
 329. 202 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 330. Id. at 991 (emphasis added by the court) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2000)). 
 331. Id. 
 332. 349 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 333. Id. at 869. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. at 871.  The statute provides a correction of error defense as follows: 
A creditor . . . has no liability under this section . . . for any failure to comply 
with any requirement imposed under this part . . . if within sixty days after 
discovering an error, . . . and prior to the institution of an action under this 
section or the receipt of written notice of the error from the obligor, the 
creditor or assignee notifies the person concerned of the error and makes 
whatever adjustments in the appropriate account are necessary to assure that 
the person will not be required to pay an amount in excess of the charge 
actually disclosed, or the dollar equivalent of the annual percentage rate 
actually disclosed, whichever is lower. 
15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) (2000). 
 336. See Thomka v. A.Z. Chevrolet, Inc., 619 F.2d 246, 251–52 (3d. Cir. 1980); 
Watson v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, Inc., No. Civ.A 05-0244-CG-C, 2006 WL 328174, at 
*3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 2006); Jumbo v. Nestor Motors, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1085, 1086 (D. 
Ariz. 1977); Ralls v. Bank of N.Y. (In re Ralls), 230 B.R. 508, 518 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1999). 
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forgiving late disclosures, when in fact Truth in Lending contemplates 
timely disclosures for a consumer’s consideration.337   
In any event, this defense requires a creditor to act within sixty days 
after discovering an error.338  In Baker, there was nothing left to discover, 
for the creditor had intentionally failed to respond to the consumer’s 
request at closing for a copy of the disclosures.339  It is open to question, 
therefore, whether the court should have relied on § 1640(b) as an alternative 
ground for a resolution of the problem.  It is not clear that if § 1640(b) is 
restricted to clerical or mathematical errors, it would duplicate § 1640(c) 
dealing with the bona fide error defense.  After all, the correction of 
error defense has a time limit attached to it, and it protects the creditor if 
the creditor acts to correct the error, whereas the bona fide error defense 
is available if the error was unintentional and the creditor had procedures 
in place to avoid the problem. 
The Baker court did not have to depend on § 1640(b) in order to deny 
statutory damages to the consumer.  It could have recognized the consumer’s 
complaint as one lodged “in connection with the disclosures referred to 
in section 1638”340 and liability as attaching only for failing to comply 
with § 1635 or certain parts of § 1638(a).341  The reference to § 1635 only 
 337. It is unlikely that Congress intended to allow a lender free rein to make its 
disclosures after the transaction without incurring any liability once it falls within § 1638(b).  
A consumer would surely be at a disadvantage in this context, because he would be 
deprived of an opportunity to reflect on the terms of the transaction.  It has been said that 
“TILA’s timing requirements have no meaning if disclosures always can be provided 
after-the-fact with no penalty.”  NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 8.6.5.3.4 
(Supp. 2006).  But see ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 5, ¶ 12.05[3][a], at 839 (“Congress 
granted a creditor the right to cure ‘any failure to comply with any requirement.’”). 
 338. “A creditor . . . has no liability . . . for any failure to comply with any requirement 
imposed under this part or part E of this subchapter, if within sixty days after discovering 
an error, . . . the creditor . . . notifies the person concerned of the error . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 1640(b) 
(2000). 
 339. The court recited the facts as follows: “[D]espite being asked for a copy of the 
signed contract, Defendant refused to provide Plaintiffs with a copy of either contract.  
Plaintiffs finally received a copy of the second contract approximately three weeks later . . . .”  
Baker, 349 F.3d at 864.  It is open to question whether there was anything for the creditor in 
Baker to discover when it intentionally refused to give the consumer the disclosures at 
closing.  See id.  It is submitted that the sixty-day correction defense should not 
apply, as in this case, to an intentional violation.  See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
supra note 4, § 8.6.5.3.4 n.404.3 (Supp. 2006). 
 340. The creditor’s failure to comply with the requirements of § 1635 and certain 
parts of § 1638(a) gives rise to liability, but it is “[i]n connection with the disclosures 
referred to in section 1638.”  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2000). 
 341. The Seventh Circuit took this approach in Brown v. Payday Check Advance, 
when it denied statutory damages for a creditor’s violation of the format requirements in 




serves to emphasize the point that the drafters must have had other 
remedies in mind when they delineated the limits of liability in § 1640(a).  
In the same way that the drafters referred to § 1635 in discussing 
liability in connection with § 1638 disclosures, they could have included 
any other section they had in mind for statutory damages.  Section 1638(b) 
plays a role in the disclosure scheme by requiring the creditor to act at a 
certain time, but such action still takes place “in connection with the 
disclosures referred to in § 1638.”  The court could have buttressed 
its position by emphasizing that § 1638(b) is not an independent mandate 
totally divorced from the § 1638 disclosures.  As a matter of fact, § 1638(b) 
refers to “the disclosures required under subsection (a).”  It seems, therefore, 
that the statutory damages contemplated relate to the same disclosures 
recognized by § 1638 and § 1640.  While it is true that § 1638(b)(1) does 
not prescribe disclosures, it fulfills its mission by dictating the time 
when a creditor should make its disclosures, and in that sense justifies 
§ 1640’s reference to it. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
It is evident that Truth in Lending has stood the test of time and has 
weathered a storm of criticism over the years.342  Nevertheless, there is 
the statute.  202 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, 
Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121, 126–27 (W.D. Mich. 2002); Stevens v. Brookdale Dodge, Inc., No. 
Civ. 00-2632 JELJGL, 2002 WL 31941158, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 2002); Nigh v. 
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 535, 549 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d 319 
F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004). 
 342. In the early days when Congress was considering Truth in Lending legislation, 
a House Report gave some inkling of the problems that consumers faced.  It reported: 
    Today the consumer is faced with a number of credit disclosure practices, 
most of which are not directly comparable to one another.  With respect to rate, 
some creditors employ an “add-on” rate, which is based on the original balance 
of the obligation as opposed to the declining balance.  This has the effect of 
underestimating the simple annual rate by approximately 50 percent. 
    . . . . 
    Other creditors add a number of additional fees or charges to the basic finance 
charge, such as credit investigation fees, credit life insurance, and various “service” 
charges.  This permits a creditor to quote a low rate while actually earning a 
higher yield through the additional fees and charges. 
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 13 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1970–71.  
Senator Paul Douglas introduced the first Truth in Lending bill in 1960, S. 2755, 86th 
Cong. (1960).  When he introduced a 1963 version, he commented: “The consumer is 
faced with a bewildering and indeed incomprehensible variety of rate statements and 
charges when he borrows money or buys an article on the installment plan.”  109 CONG. 
REC. 2029 (1963).  When the Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. 1, 82 Stat. 
146 (1968), was passed in 1968,  it set a new disclosure standard for consumer loans.  It 
was only a question of time before Congress had to respond to the criticism of the 
constituencies affected by the new legislation.  The 1980 Senate Report identified some 
of the problems: “There is considerable evidence, for example, that disclosure forms 
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still work to be done to make the required disclosures palatable to 
lenders and consumers alike, and to remove some of the ambiguities in 
TILA.  As the Supreme Court pointed out in Household Credit Services, 
Inc. v. Pfennig, the term “finance charge” standing alone is ambiguous,343 
and there is “some connection between the over-limit fee and an extension 
of credit.”344  But the Court agreed that the “incident to” language in the 
definition of “finance charge” does not clarify whether TILA requires a 
substantial connection, and where TILA deals with over-limit fees, it 
requires their disclosure “in connection with an extension of credit” 
rather than “incident to the extension of credit.”345  This ambiguity in the 
statutory language led the Court to rely on the regulation, which 
excludes over-limit fees from the definition of “finance charge.”346  But 
the Pfennig decision merely highlights the difficulty of categorizing the 
finance charge.  Although Regulation Z defines it as the cost of credit,347 
there is no unanimity about the constituent elements thereof, and thus 
lenders have always tried to bring themselves within the exceptions 
recognized by TILA and Regulation Z.348  The more charges a lender 
given consumers are too lengthy and difficult to understand.  Creditors, on the other 
hand, have encountered increasing difficulty in keeping current with a steady stream of 
administrative interpretations and amendments, as well as highly technical judicial 
decisions.”  S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 16 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 252.  
As a result, Congress passed the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act in 
1980, which addressed most of the concerns about information overload and lengthy, 
legalistic disclosures.  Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, 94 Stat. 168 (1980) (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 343. 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004). 
 344. Id. at 240. 
 345. Id. at 241. 
 346. See id. at 240–41.  Regulation Z, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2000), excludes “[c]harges . . . for exceeding a credit 
limit.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c) (2007). 
 347. Regulation Z defines the finance charge as follows: 
The finance charge is the cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount.  It 
includes any charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed 
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the 
extension of credit.  It does not include any charge of a type payable in a comparable 
cash transaction. 
12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a). 
 348. The Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
addressed concerns about the finance charge in a 1998 joint report to Congress.  They 
made the following observations: 
The calculation and disclosure of the finance charge and the APR have been at 
the heart of the debate over both the usefulness and the regulatory burden of 
TILA.  Much of the difficulty arises not from the mathematical requirements 




can exclude from the finance charge, the better off it is in terms of 
disclosing the cost of credit.349  Two lenders disclosing the same finance 
charge expressed as an annual percentage rate may in fact be charging 
the consumer different fees that are not included in the finance charge, 
but the consumer will never be any wiser about the matter.  It is to the 
consumer’s advantage, therefore, for lenders to be governed by a more 
reliable indicator of the cost of credit, and this can be accomplished by 
reducing as much as possible the exceptions relating to the finance 
charge.350  Even though Regulation Z excludes “[c]harges . . . for paying 
items that overdraw an account,”351 the exception applies unless the parties 
previously agreed in writing that such charges should be part of the 
finance charge.352  This is but one example of a lender being able to opt 
for its own designation of a particular charge.  In this instance, a lender 
may avoid the label of a finance charge simply by avoiding a written 
agreement with the consumer, even if the consumer habitually exceeds his 
credit limit without any objection from the lender.  Something must be 
done to provide a more realistic definition of a finance charge.353
Truth in Lending has disappointed consumers in another area: the 
timing and form of disclosures.  If the lender puts the Truth in Lending 
disclosures in the same document as the credit contract, some courts354 
for calculating the finance charge and the APR, but from the issue of what is a 
finance charge and what is not. 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
JOINT REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING REFORM TO THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 
AND THE REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 9 (1998), available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/tila.pdf [hereinafter FRB & HUD JOINT REPORT]. 
 349. The FRB & HUD Joint Report made the point: “Whatever the initial intention, 
however, neither the finance charge nor its corresponding APR currently discloses a total 
cost of credit.  From the start, the Congress narrowed the concept by carving out several 
fees from the definition of the finance charge.”  Id. at 8.  It has been said that “Congress 
never uniformly rationalized the definition of the finance charge in light of the purpose 
of the TIL Act because it contains numerous exceptions to the general rule that cannot be 
justified theoretically even if they make sense practically or politically.”  ROHNER & 
MILLER, supra note 5, ¶ 3.02[1]; see also Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and 
Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 58 
(2005). 
 350. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, § 3.2.2; Rohner & Durkin, 
supra note 274, at 150; Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost 
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 
807, 901 (2003). 
 351. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(3) (2007). 
 352. Id. 
 353. See FRB & HUD JOINT REPORT, supra note 348, at 13–14; Rohner & Durkin, 
supra note 274, at 189. 
 354. See Spearman v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 312 F.3d 848, 850–51 (7th 
Cir. 2002); Haun v. Don Mealey Imports, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1304–06 (M.D. Fla. 
2003); Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 535, 547–49 (E.D. Va. 
2001), aff’d 319 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004). 
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and the Official Staff Commentary355 agree that the consumer can review 
and then sign a multiple-copy contract, and then the lender can separate 
the copies and give one copy to the consumer.  The lender does not have to 
give the consumer two separate copies of the document before consummation.  
The consumer’s interests would be better served if the lender gave the 
consumer two copies of the document in such a transaction in order to remove 
any doubts that it has provided the disclosures before consummation in a 
form that the consumer may keep.356  The Commentary advises that a lender 
complies with the law if it gives the consumer a copy of the document 
containing the credit contract and disclosures to read and sign, and the 
consumer then receives a copy to keep when he becomes obligated.357  
The Commentary also recognizes that the consumer must be free “to take 
possession of and review the document in its entirety before signing.”358  
There is no better way of making that point than by giving the consumer a 
copy that will remain his at all cost, and then once he is satisfied, giving 
him another copy for signature.  The essential feature of the transaction 
is to convince the consumer of the importance of his ability to keep a 
preconsummation copy of the document, and that he does not have to 
depend on a signing to keep it either before or after review. 
A consumer needs more protection on another front.  The change-in-terms 
provision which some lenders have used to cause mischief in the marketplace 
should be accommodated in some fashion as part of the required Truth in 
Lending disclosures.  It is not satisfactory for a lender to entice a consumer 
into a transaction with attractive features, only to burden him shortly 
thereafter with less attractive terms that the consumer could not have 
anticipated.  If it is important for a lender to highlight the salient terms of the 
credit offer, then it must be equally important for the lender to indicate in 
the same location the conditions under which those terms are subject to 
change.  That disclosure framework should also make room for the possibility 
of arbitration, so that a consumer is not left wondering whether he must 
renounce a judicial forum in favor of arbitration. 
 355. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3 (2007). 
 356. See Polk v. Crown Auto, Inc., 221 F.3d 691, 692 (4th Cir. 2000); Gillom v. 
Ralph Thayer Automotive Livonia, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 763, 768 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Kilbourn 
v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121, 124 (W.D. Mich. 2002); Walters v. First 
State Bank, 134 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781–82 (W.D. Va. 2001). 
 357. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. 1, cmt. 17(b)-3. 
 358. Id. 




Finally, now that the Supreme Court has spoken on the question of 
damages, there is no longer any doubt that the $100/$1000 limits apply 
to both lease and non-lease transactions.359  However, one can only 
hope that any overhaul of the statute will take a neater approach to 
§ 1640(a)(2)(A),360 and while the drafters are at it, they may want to 
clarify the protection about damages for a violation of § 1638(b). 
 359. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 51 (2004). 
 360. Section 1640(a) provides for damages in an individual action equal to the sum 
of: 
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure; 
(2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance charge 
in connection with the transaction, (ii) in the case of an individual action relating to 
a consumer lease under part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total amount 
of monthly payments under the lease, except that liability under this subparagraph 
shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000, or (iii) in the case of an 
individual action relating to a credit transaction not under an open end credit plan 
that is secured by real property or a dwelling, not less than $200 or greater than 
$2,000 . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1), (2)(A) (2000).  The ambiguity that the Court in Koons Buick 
Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh had to deal with centered on the words “liability under this 
subparagraph.”  543 U.S. 50, 54–55 (2004).  The word “subparagraph” seems a little out 
of place in the literal sense. 
